1 Thursday, 14 June 2012 2 (10.00 am) 3 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, Mr Jay. 4 MR JAY: Today's witness is the Right Honourable 5 David Cameron, please. 6 MR DAVID WILLIAM DONALD CAMERON (sworn) 7 Questions by MR JAY 8 MR JAY: First of all, Mr Cameron, your full name, please? 9 A. David William Donald Cameron. 10 Q. Thank you. You've kindly provided us with a witness 11 statement dated 4 May of this year. It extends to 84 12 pages and possesses three exhibits. Subject to one very 13 minor matter, to which we will come in due course, is 14 this the formal evidence you're tendering to our 15 Inquiry? 16 A. It is. 17 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Prime Minister, as I have said to 18 many other witnesses, I am extremely grateful for the 19 obvious work that you, no doubt with assistance, have 20 put into your evidence and the material that you've 21 provided for the Inquiry at a time when there have 22 obviously been many other calls on your time. Thank 23 you. 24 A. Pleasure. 25 MR JAY: Mr Cameron, may I start with two general questions 1 1 about your career before 2001, which is the date you 2 entered Parliament. You were special adviser at both 3 the Treasury and the Home Office between 1992 and 1994; 4 is that right? 5 A. That's right. 6 Q. In your dealings with third parties, to what extent, if 7 ever, did you express an opinion which was not the 8 opinion of your minister, without making it clear that 9 it wasn't? 10 A. Well, it's quite a long time ago, so it's hard to 11 remember all the interactions I had. Obviously as 12 a special adviser, I would have had contacts with 13 businesses, as you say, third parties. I mean, the job 14 of a special adviser generally was to often be 15 a mouthpiece for your minister, sometimes to be a bit of 16 a sponge in terms of soaking up a lot of people that 17 wanted to see the minister but the minister didn't have 18 time, but on occasions I'm sure I would have made clear 19 to people my own view about something, but I can't think 20 of particular instances. 21 Q. On such occasions, do you think you would have made it 22 clear to the third party that you were expressing your 23 own opinion and not your minister's opinion? 24 A. I would hope so. 25 Q. And from your own experience, to what extent do you 2 1 think was your approach orthodox or unorthodox? 2 A. I suppose fairly orthodox. When I became a special 3 adviser, I'd been working at the Conservative research 4 department at Conservative central office for a number 5 of years, and my job as a special adviser was very much 6 as a political special adviser. I was a speech writer, 7 I was advising on party policy, doing the party 8 political side of the minister's job, rather than being 9 an expert special adviser. 10 In the Treasury, for instance, we had some expert 11 special advisers who were tax specialists or economists, 12 whereas I was more the general political adviser. 13 Q. Thank you. You were at Carlton Communications as we 14 know between 1994 and 2001. We're plainly in the realm 15 of broadcast communications and not print media 16 specifically. You tell us about how those experiences 17 influenced your thinking between paragraphs 61 and 66 of 18 your statement, but am I right in deducing that it was 19 your media background which at least in part brought you 20 into contact with journalists, and it's that contact 21 which has led to the development of friendships? 22 A. Well, there were various parts to my job at Carlton. 23 One part was to deal with the regulatory environment 24 that television and television companies faced, which 25 was quite a controlled -- quite a strict regulatory 3 1 environment. That was one part of the job. Another 2 part of the job was dealing with investors and 3 shareholders and the whole investor relations, which 4 meant dealing with them, and another part was press 5 handling and press relations. 6 So I formed some relationships with journalists 7 during that period, but also probably in terms of 8 political journalists I got to know, I would have said 9 that was more related to the time when I was a special 10 adviser, because I was dealing with political 11 journalists then and some of them are still around 12 today. 13 Q. Thank you. To what extent has your background in these 14 friendships provided you with knowledge and insights 15 into how newspaper news desks function? 16 A. Well, some knowledge, but not -- you know, I've never 17 worked in a newsroom, so some knowledge and 18 understanding, but not as much as someone who's actually 19 worked there. I would say my time at Carlton probably 20 taught me more about the television industry, about how 21 it was regulated, and maybe we'll come on to this, a lot 22 of the views I formed about media, media policy, media 23 regulation, the BBC -- Carlton was quite a formative 24 period because I was working for a big part of the 25 British broadcasting industry, ITV effectively, and 4 1 I formed a lot of views and opinions then which I still 2 hold today. 3 Q. Thank you. I'm going to divide your evidence up if I 4 may into five general headings. The first heading is 5 general perspectives on the development of media issues. 6 May we look now, please, at paragraphs 13 and 14 of your 7 statement. Page 04099. 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. You explain that the media is the instrument of 10 communication and integral to the democratic process, 11 though we are all agreed the contact between politicians 12 and media is inevitable, necessary, not inherently 13 unhealthy. Is that right? 14 A. Absolutely. It's not the only way we communicate with 15 people, because obviously you have some direct forms of 16 communication, particularly at election time, leaflets 17 and the like, but it is a very big part of the way we 18 communicate, so the relationships are important. 19 Q. Paragraph 14, you refer to background discussions. Is 20 that intended to include off-the-record discussions? 21 A. Yes. Off-the-record discussions, but also discussions 22 to try and -- for journalists to understand more about 23 you, because you want to -- you want people to 24 understand your motivations, to understand your 25 character, your judgment, your views, and why you hold 5 1 them. So these conversations are important and that's 2 why the relationship is important. 3 Q. In paragraph 15, you make it clear that a lot depends on 4 building the trust of individual journalists. How easy 5 or difficult has that been for you? 6 A. Well, it varies completely with the person concerned. 7 So sometimes you strike up a good and strong 8 relationship, sometimes you struggle. 9 Q. In paragraph 15, you also say: 10 "The media plays a vital part in interpreting and 11 explaining government announcements, policies and events 12 to the public." 13 In your view, and putting broadcasters to one side, 14 has the press discharged those obligations accurately 15 and fairly over the last 11 years, being the current 16 ambit of your political career? 17 A. I think it's changed a lot. I mean asking politicians 18 whether they're happy with the way the media report the 19 news as we see it is, you know, it's a bit like asking 20 farmers about the weather. We're always going to 21 complain. 22 I think a lot of the evidence that's been put 23 forward in the sessions you've had where people have 24 talked about the growth of the 24-hour news culture, the 25 fact that things move so fast means that I think 6 1 newspapers have been put in a difficult position, 2 because the news has been made and reported long before 3 they reach their deadlines and they publish their papers 4 the next day, so I think newspapers have moved more 5 towards trying to find impact, trying to find an angle 6 on a story, rather than, as would have been the case 7 before 24-hour news and all the rest of it, of just 8 reporting what happened the day before. 9 So I think there has been a change, but I think 10 that's quite a lot to do with technology and the 11 development of media rather than anything else. 12 Q. But a change for the better, for the worse or in the end 13 neutral? 14 A. I think from the politicians' point of view, and 15 particularly perhaps from the government's point of 16 view, it's sometimes a change for the worse, because if 17 there's a big announcement, something we think is very 18 important, that gets announced on the television, it 19 gets picked over by the 24-hour news, and it's quite 20 understandable that the newspapers, by the time they 21 come out the next day, have to find something different, 22 and I completely understand why they want to do that, 23 but from the perspective of trying to explain to the 24 country why you're making difficult decisions, why 25 you're reforming the health service in this way, why 7 1 you're trying to cut the deficit in that way, sometimes 2 you'd love it if you could just try and get across more 3 what it is you actually decided to do rather than an 4 endless analysis of what the motives were or what the 5 splits were or whatever, but politicians will always 6 complain about this sort of thing, so I wouldn't put too 7 much weight on it. 8 Q. Do you think -- 9 A. Sorry, what it has leant me towards is spending quite 10 a lot of the focus, and this is in my evidence, on 11 broadcasting, and this partly goes back to my life at 12 Carlton, when I formed a view that if you really want to 13 get through to people, television is an incredibly 14 powerful medium, and as the media markets are sort of 15 broken down and newspapers are selling fewer copies and 16 more people are looking at the Internet, yes, the 17 audience for these big news programmes has fallen, but 18 funnily enough their power in many ways has almost got 19 greater, because the one thing lots of people do do all 20 at the same time is watch the main news bulletins in the 21 evening. So if you want to explain why you're doing 22 what you're doing, if you want to get things across, 23 television, as I try to explain here, is extraordinarily 24 important and powerful, so it mustn't be left out of the 25 mix. 8 1 Q. Yes, and broadcasters, of course, are subject to 2 different obligations -- 3 A. Absolutely, and rightly so. 4 Q. Thank you. In paragraphs 16 and 17, you give examples 5 of the benefits, and this relates to campaigns, and also 6 you give an example of a journalist from the Sunday 7 Telegraph accompanying you in August of last year -- 8 this is in the context of the riots. But presumably you 9 would agree that this work is easier in the realm of 10 less politically charged issues; is that right? 11 A. What is easier? Doing interviews or campaigns or ...? 12 Q. The benefits which accrue from campaigns, and it's 13 easier, it's less tendentious, I suppose, in areas which 14 are less politically charged. 15 A. I suppose that's the case, yes. 16 Q. Would you say the same about some of the shriller 17 campaigns which we've seen in certain sections of the 18 press over the years? 19 A. I would say that these campaigns newspapers run -- and 20 it's not always just newspapers, television stations can 21 run campaigns too -- some of them are extraordinarily 22 important and powerful. A number of your witnesses have 23 mentioned the Macpherson work by the Daily Mail. 24 I think that was -- the Lawrence trial case. That was 25 extremely important. 9 1 Some of them are very reflective of the readers of 2 that paper and some of them are more about perhaps what 3 the editor cares about. And I think the politician has 4 to just judge in each case: is this a campaign that is 5 right and reflective of what people really think? Is 6 this something that needs to be answered? Or is it 7 something I'm prepared to have a disagreement about? 8 A recent example of a disagreement would be the 9 "hands off our land" campaign by the Telegraph objecting 10 to the planning reforms. I felt we need to reform the 11 planning system, we have to have that argument. Let's 12 listen to their points, but it's an argument we need to 13 have. 14 Some of them, and you might be referring to the 15 Sarah's Law campaign, some of them, yes, are very 16 controversial, but I think it's good that these 17 campaigns are put forward because it's part of the 18 challenge in a democratic system to say to the 19 politicians, you know, a lot of people care about this, 20 what are you doing about this, what's your answer to 21 this question? And I think it's good and right we have 22 that sort of vigorous debate. 23 Q. Although the volume on the megaphone is turned up very 24 loud, it's difficult to separate the noise from the 25 message, would you agree? 10 1 A. I'm not sure I would. I think generally because, as 2 I've said, I think the 24-hour news cycle has meant that 3 newspapers have had to turn up the volume on everything, 4 and I think sometimes I feel newspaper reporting and 5 coverage can be -- it feels like you're being shouted at 6 rather than spoken to on lots of things. 7 On these campaigns, I wouldn't particularly say that 8 because if a newspaper gets a good campaign going and it 9 taps into a vein of public concern, then actually 10 they're doing an important job for our democracy and the 11 politicians need to answer, and for instance, the 12 Sarah's Law campaign, you know, I think there were quite 13 a lot of people who were quite condescending and said, 14 "Oh, you don't understand, of course we can't tell 15 anyone anything about paedophiles", and actually the 16 public were very angry about this and the public were 17 saying, "All parents worry about their children and the 18 dangers to their children more than anything", and 19 I think it's important politicians sort of understand 20 that and respond to that rather than just trying to push 21 it away. 22 Q. In paragraph 19 you explain that in order to maintain 23 and enhance the benefits you've identified, this has to 24 be based on mutual respect and understanding between 25 politicians and the media of their respective roles and 11 1 without favours, but how does one foster, in your view, 2 that necessary degree of mutual respect and 3 understanding? 4 A. Well, I think it's a very difficult question and I don't 5 think we have it at the moment, frankly. I think the 6 relationship, while I argue that it has got sort of too 7 close and there are unhealthy parts to it, as I argue in 8 my evidence, it's also not a particularly trusting 9 relationship at the moment. I think a lot of 10 politicians think the press always get it wrong and the 11 rest of it, and a lot of the press think politicians are 12 in it for themselves, aren't in it for the right 13 reasons, and it's become a bad relationship. 14 How we get it to a better place, I think part of it 15 will be about having this greater transparency, having 16 better regulation, having a little bit more distance. 17 That will be part of respect. But respect also has to 18 come from high standards in both places as it were. The 19 expenses scandal was a massive knock to Parliament and 20 politicians' standing and politicians have to prove that 21 they're worthy of respect and the press obviously has 22 taken a tremendous knock, rightly, from some of the 23 appalling things we've found out through this Inquiry, 24 and respect has to be earned on both sides. 25 Q. You refer to having a bit more distance. That depends, 12 1 I suppose, on each party to the debate, as it were, 2 having a sense of propriety as to what is right and 3 where the boundaries are. Are we agreed about that? 4 A. I think that's right, but distance is also about for the 5 politician, and this relates to the issue of the 24-hour 6 news cycle. There is a difficulty in -- I'm not 7 expecting sympathy for this, but there's a difficulty in 8 politics that you are fighting a sort of permanent 9 battle of issues being thrown at you hour by hour where 10 responses are demanded incredibly quickly, and it can, 11 if you're not careful, take up all your energy in 12 dealing with that, and that is hopeless, because if 13 that's what you spend your time doing, you will never 14 reform our schools, cut our deficit, deal with our 15 economic problems and all the rest of it. 16 When I say distance, partly what I mean is that the 17 politicians, and particularly prime ministers and 18 Cabinet ministers, have to get out of the 24-hour news 19 cycle, not try and fight every hourly battle, and focus 20 on long-term issues and be prepared sometimes to take 21 a hit on a story they don't respond to so quickly. 22 That's very easy to say that, but I did actually on 23 getting into Number 10 Downing Street try to do that. 24 I'm not sure it's always been totally successful, but 25 that's part of what I mean by distance. It means not 13 1 sitting under a 24-hour news television screen looking 2 at the ticker and worrying about what's happening every 3 hour. If you do that, you get completely buried by the 4 daily news agenda. 5 Q. The term a bit more distance could relate to the 6 quantity of engagement, and you've told us about that, 7 but it also could relate to the quality of individual 8 engagements with journalists, are we agreed? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. And are we also agreed that in that second sense we 11 need, in Sir John Major's term, constructive tension, or 12 certainly each party, each side having a proper 13 understanding of what is appropriate and what may not be 14 appropriate? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Is that so? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. And do you feel in relation to the past, without 19 alighting on individual examples, that in that second 20 sense there may not have been sufficient distance? 21 A. Yes. I mean, that's part of my evidence, really, is to 22 say I think this relationship has been going wrong for, 23 you know -- it's never been perfect. There have always 24 been problems and you can point to examples of Churchill 25 putting Beaverbrook as a minister. There have been 14 1 issues for years. 2 But I think in the last 20 years, I think the 3 relationship has not been right. I think it has been 4 too close, as I explain in my evidence, and I think we 5 need to try and get it on a better footing. 6 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 20, you refer to the need to 7 avoid excessive regulation, and I suppose defining the 8 issue in that way, we all necessarily agree with that. 9 The key principle you identify as being transparency. 10 Is transparency sufficient, though? 11 A. No. I don't think it is. I think where transparency 12 can help is -- in my evidence, I tried very hard to 13 think carefully what are the risks when this 14 relationship isn't right, and I tried to enumerate the 15 risks, and some of the risks -- and one of them perhaps 16 is the perception that media owners or editors or key 17 figures in the media sort of wield too much power -- 18 that risk I think you do mitigate in part by 19 transparency, because if everyone can see how often you 20 meet people, who you're meeting and the rest of it, that 21 enables others to draw comment on your meetings, and 22 I think we have a much better situation with 23 transparency which this government has introduced, but 24 clearly that's not enough because there are other risks 25 and some of those other risks need effective regulation 15 1 to deal with them. 2 I don't think the regulatory system that we have at 3 the moment works, and so we need to improve it, and so 4 if we just said transparency and that's it, everyone can 5 see who's meeting whom, that's enough, I think that 6 would be a mistake. 7 Q. We'll come to your ideas in due course, Mr Cameron. 8 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Are you here talking about the 9 relationship between the press and politicians or at 10 a wider level? Because in relation to how politicians 11 engage with the press, I would struggle a bit to see how 12 regulation could assist. It's a cultural thing, it 13 seems to me. 14 A. What I would say, sir, is the transparency can help 15 address some of the problems of perception because 16 people can see who you're meeting and when, but one of 17 my arguments is that because the relationship hasn't 18 been right, because it has been too close, as I put it, 19 the politicians and the press haven't spent enough time 20 discussing and sorting out the regulatory system under 21 which the press exist. 22 We need to fix that, and I thought Ed Miliband put 23 this quite well. He identified another risk, which is 24 it's quite difficult for the politician to sort out on 25 their own the regulatory situation the press face 16 1 because we are clearly an interested party, and if we 2 just steamed ahead and said, "Right, we're going to 3 regulate it in this way or that way", I think the press 4 would have a legitimate argument to say, "Hold on 5 a second, you're beneficiaries of this and we need some 6 independence" and that's part of what this investigation 7 is about. 8 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes. 9 A. Sorry. 10 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: No, no, I understand the point. But 11 it seems to me, if I just go back to the politician 12 relationship with the press, it's absolutely critical 13 and part of our democracy, I entirely understand that, 14 and as I've said to a number of people, one can't 15 interfere with human beings being friendly with other 16 human beings, but to some extent would you agree that 17 the problem that the politicians face is that actually 18 the onus is on them because the press will feel, perhaps 19 legitimately, that they ought to push in order to be 20 able to hold politicians to account, to investigate what 21 they want to investigate, and the more ways they can get 22 information the better, therefore it's up to the 23 politicians actually to say, "This dynamic needs to be 24 changed"? 25 A. You need to draw some boundaries, but it's very 17 1 difficult to do because the politicians do have an 2 interest in not being investigated vigorously. 3 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes. 4 A. If we take the expenses scandal, it was deeply painful 5 for politicians but it was absolutely right that it was 6 revealed and I think it's -- you know, the free press we 7 have in this country is a very important part of our 8 democratic system. We shouldn't fetter them 9 inappropriately, that would be completely wrong, and we 10 need to have the politicians continually called to 11 account by vigorous press campaigns. 12 That's why we need to get this relationship right. 13 Transparency is part of it, how we make a regulatory 14 system work is another, and I think we need to try and 15 find a way for some independence to be brought to that, 16 so hopefully press and politicians can say, "Well, it 17 may not be perfect in every way, but this is a fair set 18 of ideas and we can put them in place." 19 MR JAY: Mr Cameron, some of the risks, you introduce these 20 in paragraph 22 of your statement on page 04103. The 21 first in paragraph 23: 22 "... because politicians can focus on media coverage 23 there is a danger they do not devote enough time to 24 considering the wider issues of how the media operates 25 and potential instances of bad practices." 18 1 Why does that consequence flow from the focus on 2 media coverage? 3 A. I think because the press want access, politicians want 4 coverage for what they're doing and their policies and 5 their approach, and so the two parties focus on that, 6 and when things were going wrong, as they clearly were, 7 and I give the examples of the Information 8 Commissioner's reports, what didn't happen was the 9 politicians and the press didn't sort of disengage and 10 say, "Hold on a second, we have a real problem here, we 11 need to deal with it, it might need changes to the law, 12 it might need an improvement of the self-regulatory 13 system", et cetera, et cetera, that didn't happen. 14 I thought Tony Blair's evidence to you was quite 15 powerful. He said -- I'm not quoting -- "I know there 16 was a problem but it was an enormous challenge and I had 17 all these other challenges to deal with and so I didn't 18 deal with it", and I think that was a sort of 19 encapsulation of my risk number one. 20 Q. In relation to Operation Motorman, you say at the end of 21 the paragraph: 22 "I regret that opposition front bench politicians 23 failed to devote enough time to scrutinise the 24 government and hold them to account." 25 But did you devote any time to this issue? 19 1 A. I was aware of the issue, but frankly I think, as I say 2 here, the government didn't give enough attention, the 3 opposition didn't give it enough attention, and I think 4 that's a matter for regret. 5 Q. When you refer a little bit higher up in this paragraph 6 to the CMS Select Committee examining other 7 media-related issues in 2003, without going into any of 8 the detail, is that intended to be a reference to 9 evidence Rebekah Wade as she then was gave to the 10 committee on that occasion? 11 A. No, I think it's just a general reference to things that 12 weren't right. When I was doing -- writing the 13 evidence, I was trying to reflect on how I felt as -- 14 I wasn't leader of the opposition then, but just 15 generally, and I looked back at some of the evidence 16 that had come out and thought, well, you know, 17 Parliament was doing its job and the Select Committee 18 was doing its job, but the party leaderships weren't 19 picking up these issues in perhaps the way they should 20 have done. 21 Q. Before the House of Commons Liaison Committee when you 22 appeared there in September of last year, you put the 23 point explicitly that, and I paraphrase: an overly close 24 relationship permitted regulation issues to be put on 25 the back-burner. 20 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. So you're attributing cause and effect, is that 3 something that you're comfortable with? 4 A. Yes, I think that's right. The way I've put it is that 5 politicians were spending, you know, their time trying 6 to get their message across, and when it was necessary 7 to disengage from that and discuss regulatory issues, 8 that wasn't happening, and I think that's been happening 9 under governments of both parties for some time. 10 Q. What was your reaction to Mr Blair's "feral beast" 11 speech of June 2007, aside from the fact that it was 12 a few days before he was departing? 13 A. I can't -- I mean, I read it again actually in the last 14 couple of days preparing for this, and there's a lot of 15 good points in it, but the trouble is there isn't much 16 of a solution. There was quite a good analysis of this 17 problem of the 24-hour news cycle, the turning up of the 18 volume on news and comment, but there wasn't really 19 a specific solution. 20 I can't remember what I said at the time. I have 21 a horrible feeling that, like all these attempts to try 22 and raise the issue, I suspect the political parties 23 probably didn't really give it much of a backing. 24 Q. Okay. Paragraph 25, Mr Cameron, you identify a second 25 risk -- 21 1 A. Mm. 2 Q. -- that can lead to "the public perception that media 3 proprietors and senior media figures in general, or 4 specific individuals in particular, can have too loud 5 a voice in the country's politics." 6 Isn't it more than just a perception, though, that 7 particular aspect you've identified there? 8 A. Well, I think that depends on how robust politicians are 9 in standing up and defending their values, their 10 policies, their approach. I think we deal with this 11 risk by making transparent all these meetings so people 12 can see who you're seeing, but I would argue very 13 strongly that my policies are determined by my beliefs, 14 values, my party's beliefs and values, and not by what 15 a particular editor or proprietor might want, and I give 16 you some examples in my evidence of where I've had, you 17 know, quite strong disagreements with -- whether it's 18 Rupert Murdoch over the BBC or the Daily Telegraph over 19 planning or what have you. 20 So this is a risk. I think you mitigate it through 21 transparency, but as I also going on to say, you need 22 a vigorous public debate so people can see if 23 politicians are regularly caving in to media pressure 24 that goes against something they previously said, well, 25 the public can draw their own conclusions. 22 1 Q. Looking at it more broadly, can one put it in this way: 2 part of the problem may be that politicians have been 3 guilty of a form of appeasement. They've permitted the 4 power of the press to consolidate and be exercised 5 unhindered, and that's happened really over 6 a generation? 7 A. I don't like the word "appeasement". I think that's 8 a bit too strong. I think what's happened, as I said, 9 is politicians have been focused on getting their 10 message across rather than regulation. I think there 11 have been some good examples of politicians on all sides 12 actually confronting and facing down very strong 13 campaigns that newspapers or others might have, so 14 I don't think politicians have always been guilty of 15 appeasing in that sense. 16 I use the example of identity cards or 42-day 17 detention, which I was vigorously opposed to, which some 18 parts of the press wanted. 19 But no, I think it's more than appeasement, it's 20 more about just not focusing on these regulatory issues 21 when they needed to be focused on. 22 Q. Okay. Related to that, is not the size of the voice in 23 part a manifestation of economic and commercial power? 24 In other words, we've allowed too much to accumulate in 25 the hands of a small number of individuals? 23 1 A. I think this is a difficult question. I think 2 sometimes -- a lot of the time it isn't necessarily the 3 size of the newspaper group, it's the strength of voice 4 of the paper. I mean, actually, the Daily Mail is an 5 incredibly sort of powerful voice in the nation's 6 politics because it's a very strong product, it puts its 7 voice very powerfully, and that's not related really to 8 its market power, it's to the way it pushes its agenda. 9 So I don't think it's always about market power, no. 10 Q. But do you feel nonetheless, although it might not 11 always be about market power, market power is not the 12 sole explanation, it is part of the explanation, part of 13 the problem? 14 A. I think you need -- I'm not sure about that. I think -- 15 as I say, I think you can have individual papers that 16 are particularly strident, if I can put it that way, 17 whereas if you look at -- you know, the 18 News International group not always have all the papers 19 headed in the same direction. Some of them, as it were, 20 shout a bit louder than others. So I think it's about 21 the nature of the voice necessarily. 22 Having said that, you do need effective competition 23 policy, effective rules on plurality, and perhaps we'll 24 come on to that. 25 Q. Paragraph 29 now, Mr Cameron. This is page 04105, the 24 1 third risk. We've touched on aspects of this already. 2 Allowing media pressure to "shift and therefore shake 3 the political agenda". There are a number of issues 4 here. 5 As you know, a number of witnesses have identified 6 the heart of the problem as the fusion of news and 7 comment. Do you agree with that analysis? 8 A. I don't, really, because I think it's quite difficult -- 9 look, in an ideal world it would be lovely if the front 10 page of the newspaper was all the things that happened 11 in the world yesterday and the comment was entirely 12 separate and all the rest of it, but I think it's quite 13 impractical. 14 I've been thinking about this because a lot of your 15 witnesses have made this point, and I think it's quite 16 difficult to try and separate. So often a headline 17 encapsulates both a fact but also an opinion, and 18 I think it's very clear in the press code that you're 19 not meant to mix news and comment, but it happens and 20 I think it's rather a forlorn hope to think you can 21 somehow separate them. 22 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: To some extent it plays into the 23 point you were making earlier, that whereas 50 years 24 ago, when there was little television and therefore 25 people got their news very much from their daily 25 1 newspaper and they would read the Parliamentary debate 2 or they would read of a court case, that was how they 3 learned the facts. 4 A. Yes. 5 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It really plays into your point that 6 because of the 24/7 news cycle, newspapers are now 7 required much more to provide their own angle -- 8 A. Opinion and impact. 9 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: -- I think was one of your words, and 10 that means inevitably opinion. 11 A. I think that's correct, and that's why I'm sure other 12 politicians would take this view, that of course we 13 spend a lot of time interacting with newspapers and 14 arguing with newspapers and trying to get our point 15 across, but I think if you talk to any modern political 16 party in Britain and you ask them, "What do you really 17 spend your time on more than anything?" it's actually 18 the 6 o'clock news, the 10 o'clock news. The thing 19 that's still watched, okay not by 15 million people, 20 but, I don't know, 6 million people, all at once. 21 That's where -- it's differently regulated so it's not 22 such a problem, but I think in terms of how much time do 23 we spend with all these newspapers groups and the rest 24 of it, a big big focus, particularly since I've been 25 leading the Conservative Party, has been on television 26 1 and I hope that comes across in what I say. 2 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It does mean that the argument about 3 not being held to account doesn't really work when you 4 are being held to account by broadcasting journalists 5 all the time, without it being obvious that the way that 6 they are regulated has impacted the way they treat you. 7 A. I think newspapers and television hold politicians to 8 account in a different way because of the way news is 9 put together. The newspapers do play a very important 10 role in terms of accountability because they have, you 11 know, investigative approaches and budgets and the rest 12 of it, they can really go after stories, get to the 13 details. 14 I think there is a difference, and, you know, the 15 strength of our democracy would be a lot weaker if we 16 didn't have both giving us rightly a tough time. 17 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, I wasn't for a moment suggesting 18 that wasn't right. 19 A. Yes. 20 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But it's not immediately apparent 21 that broadcasters don't hold politicians to account. It 22 seems that they do, and certainly the broadcasters from 23 whom I have heard don't recognise the suggestion that 24 they fail in their duty to ask appropriate questions or 25 probe appropriately, notwithstanding the strictures of 27 1 the Ofcom regulatory regime. 2 A. I'm sure that's right, but perhaps there are some things 3 that newspapers have been able to do because they don't 4 have the impartiality guidelines. 5 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Of course. 6 A. Things like the Stephen Lawrence campaign or other 7 campaigns, which are more, for want of a better word, 8 edgy. If you didn't have that, I'll -- yes. 9 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I entirely agree. 10 MR JAY: Can I just understand, Mr Cameron. Is your 11 analysis on the fusion of news and comment point either 12 there isn't a problem so there's no need for a solution, 13 or there is a problem but there isn't a solution? 14 A. There can be a problem in some cases, but, you know, we 15 have to -- I don't think it's solvable, so I think we 16 should not try and find some -- some of the answers 17 people have come up with I don't think are particularly 18 credible. 19 Q. The issue may be one of culture, would you agree? 20 A. Yes. I think with all these things, culture is 21 fantastically important. We can write all the rules 22 that we like and have all the training packages. 23 Whether it's for ministers' or journalists' behaviour, 24 culture is massively important, and I think it's 25 important in every aspect of life. 28 1 Q. Thank you. Can we move forward to a point you make in 2 paragraph 131, which links in with this. Page 04138. 3 Dealing with the issue of campaigns, which you've 4 covered, you say in the last sentence that you've never 5 traded or offered a position on policy in return for the 6 support of any media outlet. Do you believe that others 7 have? 8 A. I can't think of any particular examples. 9 Q. Okay. The fourth risk you identify is about lobbying, 10 but we'll come back to that later on and move back, 11 please, to paragraph 47 of your statement which we've 12 covered in part. This is the recent history showing the 13 relationship that came too close. I just want to try 14 and identify since when approximately you believe that 15 that phenomenon started to arise. 16 A. This is difficult. I would argue it's partly this 17 growth of the 24-hour news agenda and therefore the 18 different role of newspapers. I think that's had an 19 impact because politicians have wanted to try and get 20 their message across with newspapers taking, as I put, 21 a more aggressive stance. 22 I think there's also some sort of history, which 23 you've heard a lot of in the -- of, you know, the John 24 Major government, when I was a special adviser, and it 25 did have an absolutely wretched press and had a terrible 29 1 time, and I think Labour, quite understandably, thought: 2 well, if we get in, we have to be better organised, we 3 have to be more efficient at communicating. 4 I think like all things in life, I think the 5 pendulum swung too far the other way, and there was too 6 much spinning and culture of daily news fighting and all 7 the rest of it, and we need the pendulum to swing back 8 a bit, while still being professional and able 9 communicators, because you have to try and get your 10 message across in a different world. 11 I'm not trying to blame the whole thing on New 12 Labour, I think that would be wrong, but I think it's 13 been a developing story. You have the Conservative 14 government under John Major that knew there was 15 a problem, had this Calcutt process, which came to 16 nothing. The last-chance saloon as it were sort of sat 17 forever. Then you had the arrival of New Labour and 18 I think the combination of that with the 24-hour news 19 agenda is what lies behind some of the problems. 20 Q. So the pendulum was swinging in the wrong direction, as 21 it were, possibly from 1994, 1995, and was possibly in 22 the wrong place until certainly July 2011, does that 23 sound about right? 24 A. I think there have been various attempts along the way 25 to grab hold of the pendulum and do something about it. 30 1 You mentioned the "feral beast" speech. That did 2 mention a whole set of things that the last government 3 did in terms of putting briefings on the record, prime 4 ministers going in front of the liaison committee in the 5 House of Commons. I would argue that the new rules for 6 special advisers we've introduced, the greater 7 transparency. 8 So I think there's been steps, but clearly, you 9 know, why are we all here? We're here because of the 10 truly dreadful things that happened not to politicians 11 but to ordinary members of the public whose lives had 12 been turned upside down when they've already suffered 13 through losing their children, and had their lives 14 turned upside down in a totally unacceptable way and 15 this is, I think, a cathartic moment where press, 16 politicians, police, all the relationships that haven't 17 been right, we have a chance to reset them and that is 18 what we must do. 19 Q. What do you see as the harm to the public interest? How 20 would you define it, flowing from this relationship of 21 undue proximity? 22 A. The way I put it is the closeness which I've talked 23 about leads, I think, potentially to these risks, and 24 I've enumerated the risks, and clearly those risks have 25 the potential to do the public harm unless they're 31 1 properly dealt with. 2 I think this is doable and achievable, and it needs 3 to be done. 4 Q. Is it possible to describe one of the risks in this way: 5 that the relationship has become transactional, that 6 although there may not be express deals, there are 7 implied understandings or concordats, because each party 8 well knows what the other wants? 9 A. I don't accept that. First of all, on this idea of 10 overt deals, this idea that somehow the Conservative 11 Party and News International got together and said, "You 12 give us your support and we'll wave through this 13 merger", that by the way we didn't even know about at 14 that stage, I think the idea of overt deals is nonsense, 15 and you've heard that from lots of people in front of 16 this Inquiry. 17 I also don't believe in this theory that there was 18 a nod and a wink and some sort of covert agreement. Of 19 course, I wanted to win over newspapers and other 20 journalists, editors, proprietors, broadcasters. 21 I worked very hard at that because I wanted to 22 communicate what the Conservative Party and my 23 leadership could bring to the country. I made those 24 arguments. But I didn't do it on the basis of saying, 25 either overtly or covertly, "Your support will mean I'll 32 1 give you a better time on this policy or that policy", 2 and there are plenty of examples of policies that 3 I believe in that the people who were backing me didn't 4 believe in. 5 Q. Is there also a risk that overly close personal 6 relationships, by which I mean individual relationships 7 between politicians and journalists, have allowed 8 judgments to be clouded? 9 A. I think obviously you have to take care when you have 10 personal friendships, but I think that can be done, and 11 I like to think that I've done that. 12 Q. I'm still on the general perspectives, Mr Cameron. Can 13 I ask you to comment, please, on the allied vices, if 14 I can describe them as such, of manipulation of the 15 media by politicians, favouritism and anonymous 16 briefings. Have you seen evidence of these vices in 17 your own party? 18 A. Yes. These things do happen and it's deeply 19 regrettable. I think as long as there's been a press 20 and politicians, these things happen. But it is very 21 regrettable, it often makes running a political party 22 more difficult, running a government more difficult. 23 It's deeply destructive. 24 I think there are degrees of this. Of course, you 25 know, some politicians have journalists they have 33 1 a particular good relationship with, they think they're 2 going to understand a particular speech or a particular 3 idea better than others, and in this world where the 4 newspapers aren't reporting yesterday's news, because 5 that's already been reported, clearly newspapers are 6 looking for something special, they're looking for 7 a particular angle or a particular story. 8 So there are responsible ways of handling media 9 relations in that way, but briefing against people, 10 doing people down, there are some dreadful things that 11 have been done in politics on both sides in recent 12 years, and they're very, very regrettable. 13 Q. What's the solution to these vices in your view? 14 A. I don't think there's any one catch-all. I think there 15 has been a problem in terms of some individuals and some 16 special advisers, and I think we now have a better 17 special advisers' code. One of the things I wrote into 18 the code is that special advisers work for the whole 19 government, not just individual ministers. I think 20 that's important. 21 But I don't think there's any one -- as you say, 22 it's a mixture of rules and culture. 23 Q. Sir John Major made the point in relation to proprietors 24 that they're responsible for the culture in their 25 organisation and it was within their power, gift, as it 34 1 were, to put a halt to bad practice and to a poor 2 culture. Does the same argument in your view apply to 3 politicians, that it's perhaps the responsibility of 4 those at the top? 5 A. Yes. Yes, I think it is. I think it's very important. 6 If you find out that these things have been happening, 7 you need to condemn them properly and act properly. 8 I think that is the case. 9 Q. Can I ask you to address Mr Brown's point that reporting 10 is hyperbolic, it's sensationalised. He said the 11 politicians don't simply make errors of judgment, their 12 motives are always put into question. Do you associate 13 yourself as a matter of generality with that point or 14 not? 15 A. I think there are occasions when that can happen. As 16 I've said, it links back to this thing about newspapers 17 being under pressure to find something special and 18 different and go for impact, and sometimes that can mean 19 questioning motives. 20 So you do -- I don't want to make this sound like 21 sort of politicians complaining about -- of course we 22 should have a vigorous press and they should give us 23 a good going over and they do and that's fine. 24 Sometimes it is frustrating when you feel your motives 25 are endlessly being questioned, and -- but, you know, 35 1 there's bound to be a certain amount of that, but 2 I think the way I put it is that the volume knob has 3 sometimes just been turned really high in our press and 4 I'm not sure sometimes that does anyone any favours. 5 Q. The volume knob is turned too high and a consequence of 6 that is motive is always impugned, rather than if you 7 turn it down lower and examine human nature as it is, 8 usually as a result of an error of judgment mistakes are 9 made, and not some venal or appalling motive. Is that 10 the way you see -- 11 A. There have been politicians with bad motives, and if 12 a politician is discovering doing something for a bad -- 13 you know, the press shouldn't hold off making that 14 point. So that, I think, is all fair for the press to 15 challenge that, but it's just sometimes it feels as if 16 the volume knob is being turned up unnecessarily. 17 Q. May I move on now to the second area of your evidence, 18 Mr Cameron. This is your own personal approach. We can 19 start with paragraph 73 of your witness statement, which 20 is our page 04118. 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. You explain the nature and frequency of your contact: 23 "Such contact may include formal on-the-record 24 interviews, informal background discussions and 25 coincidental dialogue." 36 1 So that pattern is of course the same as everyone 2 else's? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. Paragraph 74, no formal record of who initiated the 5 contact although you believe in the majority of cases 6 contact would be initiate by your staff; is that right? 7 A. Yes. We had -- becoming leader of the Conservative 8 Party at the end of 2005, clearly we had a programme of 9 wanting to get our message and policies and approach 10 across, and that meant a proactive campaign of talking 11 to journalists and whether it was regional newspapers, 12 national newspapers, television stations, and I hope in 13 the exhibit DC2, there's a fantastic set of -- it goes 14 on for five years -- of meetings. I can't promise it's 15 100 per cent accurate because you're going back to 16 paper-based diaries 2005 and the rest of it, but it's 17 a pretty big list. 18 Q. Do you have a strategy at the beginning of each year 19 where you map out who you should be seeing over the 20 course of the year, or is it much more adventitious, in 21 other words your staff decides on a weekly or monthly 22 basis who you might see? In other words, there isn't 23 a strategy that if News International is 36 per cent of 24 the market, it follows that you should be seeing them 25 36 per cent of the time, if I can put it in that way? 37 1 A. Well, the strategy mapped out at the beginning of the 2 year are the things you want to achieve, the policies 3 you want to get across, the ideas that you want to 4 champion, and then after that, you think: right, how do 5 we do that? What's the mixture of newspapers and 6 television and direct campaigns and the rest we want to 7 do? 8 Then following that, you're looking at: where are we 9 going to have impact? 10 I like to think from the information I've given you 11 can see that I've spent a huge amount of time with all 12 newspapers, but you are thinking, you know, with all 13 respect for the Daily Mirror, there's only a certain 14 amount of impact I'm going to have from meeting with the 15 Daily Mirror, whereas the, as it were, newspapers who 16 have in the past or might in the future back 17 a Conservative cause are obviously going to be better 18 grounds for that. 19 Q. The main touchstone then is impact and, as you rightly 20 say, you're not going to devote too much time to those 21 who may not be supporting you, let's focus on those who 22 are either onside or who might be onside; that's the 23 basic point? 24 A. Yes. I just repeat again that you know that the 25 television cannot be on your side because there are 38 1 rules of impartiality, but a huge amount of time when 2 I became leader of the party was thinking how do we get 3 our message across on the television? Because, as 4 I said, I think that's the most important medium of 5 communication. 6 Q. There's no formal record you say in paragraph 77 of what 7 was discussed in each meeting and we can quite see that 8 if there were lengthy lists, that would be oppressive, 9 bureaucratic and counter-productive? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. But what about just encapsulating the gist in two or 12 three sentences of what was discussed to add greater 13 transparency. Would you favour that or not? 14 A. I think there are improvements we can make here. 15 I think the idea that someone suggested of a sort of 16 written note of every interaction with every editor, 17 every broadcast -- I think that would be overly 18 bureaucratic because most of the meetings are pretty 19 similar. You're explaining why you're in favour of free 20 schools and academies and how to get that message 21 across, and why the policy's a good idea. You're 22 explaining something that you've already published. 23 But where I think there is potential for improvement 24 is in two areas. If it's obvious that this is a meeting 25 where the proprietor or the broadcasting business or 39 1 what have you has got some, you know, commercial issues 2 they want to raise, then I think it does make sense that 3 a note is taken. Or, if in a meeting that's really 4 about your policies and your approach and the rest of 5 it, there's a discussion about commercial interests, 6 then I think again in government, you know, under the 7 Ministerial Code, I think it's probably right that the 8 minister or the politician should make a reference to 9 that to the private secretary. 10 A good example of this I give, and I don't want to, 11 you know, give a kick to an industry that's having 12 a difficult time anyway. Regional newspapers. I go all 13 over the country as other politicians do, you have lots 14 of meetings with the regional newspaper groups and 15 you're there explaining why the government's helping the 16 East Midlands or the West Country or whatever it is, but 17 often they will say, quite fairly, "We are being 18 hammered by these free newspapers that are being put out 19 by local authorities, they're taking advertising, it's 20 not fair, this is the big state as it were squashing out 21 the big society, what are you going to do about it?" 22 I think it's completely fair for them to raise that 23 point, but you could argue that is a media organisation 24 raising a policy point rather than just having an 25 exchange about politics and policies, and so in some way 40 1 that needs to be registered. 2 The problem with all this is the more rules and 3 codes we create, the more difficult it is to make sure 4 in every instance that people abide by them. I don't 5 want to create a system that doesn't work, that is 6 permanently broken. That would actually sap the faith 7 of the public in this whole area. But I think some 8 modest additions to the Ministerial Code to deal with 9 the two points I've made, I think that is something we 10 could certainly look at. 11 Q. Paragraph 79, Mr Cameron. You identify a small number 12 of journalists who are close friends of yours, not 13 included in your lists, and you name them there. 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. It's inevitable, of course, that friendships would arise 16 and these are friendships which have developed over the 17 years; is that right? 18 A. That's right. And the reason for putting this in is it 19 goes to the last point I made. The more we write these 20 rules, the more danger there is that you're going to 21 forget that you bumped into so-and-so or had a meeting 22 with such and such, and then it comes out you didn't 23 reveal that and then the public loses all the confidence 24 they had in your new transparency regime. That's the 25 purpose, I think, of -- these are people I see very 41 1 regularly and I'm never going to remember to tell my 2 office every time I see them. 3 Q. You say that sometimes informal assistance is provided 4 with speeches. I suppose the main risk here, and I ask 5 you to comment on it, is that you provide these 6 journalists with scoops or stories or, put less 7 tendentiously, with insights which they can then deploy. 8 Is that fair? 9 A. Look, there's obviously a danger, but you can't unmake 10 the friendships that you have, and some of these people 11 I've known for 20, 30 years. Some of them you get to 12 know because in some cases they're neighbours, Xan 13 Smiley. 14 I think one of the things that all ministers are 15 meant to do, and perhaps we need to sort of remind 16 people, I've done this quite recently, is you sit down 17 with your Permanent Secretary, I literally went through 18 my address book and I told my Permanent Secretary 19 virtually what every one of my friends did, if they had 20 any business interactions that might bump up against the 21 government or what have you. So at least you've had 22 that conversation with your Permanent Secretary, so that 23 then if any form of conflict does arise in the future, 24 at least it's not something that has been sort of 25 buried. 42 1 But this is -- you know, it's difficult stuff to get 2 right, this, I think. 3 Q. In paragraphs 91 to 92 of your statement, this is 4 page 04123, you're addressing the question to what 5 extent is political support discussed. Is the sense of 6 paragraph 92 in particular that the issue of political 7 support is not discussed directly, but it implicitly 8 underlies many of your discussions? 9 A. I think that's probably right. There have been 10 occasions where, you know, you're really keen to -- most 11 of the time you're trying to explain: these are my 12 policies, these are why they are right, this is why the 13 Labour Party has it wrong, or whatever. But of course 14 there are times when you're really keen for the 15 newspaper to do more to support you, whether that's 16 editorially or in the coverage that they give you. So 17 of course I have had those conversations. 18 Q. About how often do you think you've had a conversation 19 of that nature? 20 A. Not very often, because predominantly it's about, you 21 know, what -- if you take over the five years of being 22 leader of the opposition, most of the time it was about 23 what I was trying to do with the Conservative Party, 24 what policies were we cared about, what the government 25 was getting wrong, why we'd do a better job. It was all 43 1 those arguments. But obviously on occasion you'd say, 2 "We'd love a bit more support from your paper." 3 Q. Sir John Major gave us some evidence about 4 a conversation he says he had with Mr Rupert Murdoch in 5 February of 1997 in which on his account he made it 6 clear that -- that's Mr Murdoch made it clear he 7 couldn't support the Conservative Party unless policy on 8 Europe was modified. May we take it that you've not had 9 a similar conversation with him or any other proprietor 10 of that nature? 11 A. Not of that nature, no. 12 Q. Have you had conversations, though, with proprietors and 13 editors during the course of which they've made it 14 crystal clear which of your policies, on the one hand, 15 they favour, and which they don't? 16 A. Of course, yes. A lot of these people have very strong 17 views and so you have pretty robust debates about some 18 things. 19 Q. So although the point may never have been explicitly 20 made, wasn't it on occasion obvious to you what the 21 conditions for their support amounted to? 22 A. I think one can overdo this. I think in the end a lot 23 of these newspapers follow their readers' views. I felt 24 what I was trying to do, and I say this in my evidence, 25 I was trying to win back to the Conservative cause 44 1 newspapers that had been Conservative and had been won 2 over by Tony Blair. So I wasn't asking them to sign up 3 to a whole set of views that they thought were 4 completely ridiculous, I was just trying to get them to 5 return to the right cause, as it were. 6 So -- and of course, you have very robust 7 conversations about policy areas where you don't agree. 8 Q. In the example you've given, the Sun newspaper was won 9 over to Mr Blair and therefore the preponderance of 10 readers' views were convergent with New Labour -- 11 A. At that stage, yes. I think that's my point, is that at 12 the end of -- towards 1997, the Conservative government 13 obviously had fallen massively out of favour. Sun 14 readers were anyway switching to Labour, and their 15 decision, while a big blow for the Conservatives, you 16 can see a sort of natural -- that's what was happening. 17 I think under my leadership of the Conservative 18 Party, steadily Sun readers were coming over to the 19 Conservative Party, and I felt in talking to a lot of 20 Sun journalists that a lot of them were very keen for 21 their newspaper to change its stance because they felt 22 they were out of tune with their readers. 23 I think one can overdo the whole -- also, I am 24 not -- you know, no way does winning the support of this 25 newspaper or that newspaper guarantee you an election 45 1 victory. Their circulations are, if anything, getting 2 smaller. 3 Q. I think we can all agree that the point has been -- its 4 importance has been overexaggerated, but there's still 5 some degree of significance to be attached, in 6 particular to the Sun's support. 7 A. Of course. 8 Q. Would you agree on that issue? Can I go back to 2005, 9 Mr Cameron, when of course you started as leader of the 10 opposition I think in December of that year, if my 11 memory is right. Was your strategy then, as your then 12 press secretary George Eustice has said, to create 13 distance between yourself and Mr Murdoch? 14 A. I wouldn't put it like that. I'd won the leadership of 15 the Conservative Party without the support of I think 16 any newspapers, frankly. I had a pretty rocky time with 17 them during the leadership election, and I think I'd won 18 the leadership basically through what I'd said at 19 Conservative Party Conference and it was television that 20 had helped me to get my message across. 21 I wanted us to have a good relationship with 22 newspapers. I knew we needed to win over more support, 23 but to start with there were certainly some in my office 24 who were very keen on trying to do things completely 25 differently and communicate much more through the 46 1 Internet and what have you. I would say I was more 2 cautious about that, thinking we wanted to work very 3 hard on television, we should do what we could with the 4 newspapers, but I think that's the way it was. 5 It wasn't quite sort of one set of circumstances 6 after 2005 and then another set later on. 7 Q. But Mr Eustice has said, and I invite you to comment on 8 this: 9 "When I was his press secretary, we pursued 10 a strategy of quietly puncturing the arrogance of both 11 editors and proprietors and raising the status of what 12 I term real journalism." 13 Is that a fair analysis in your view or not? 14 A. I think parts of it are right, in that we did want to 15 have this -- we didn't want to go down the same route as 16 everything Labour had done. We did want to have a bit 17 more distance, but if you look at the record of the sort 18 of meetings I was having and the rest of it, I was 19 still, you know, flying off to meet proprietors and 20 trying to win people over, so I don't think it totally 21 squares up that there was one approach that was tried 22 and failed and then another approach. There's slightly 23 more elision between the two, my reflection on it. 24 Q. You also made a point that you wouldn't have flown 25 halfway around the world, if I can put it in those 47 1 terms, to speak at News Corporation's annual conference. 2 Would that have been an accurate assessment of your 3 thinking in 2005? 4 A. I certainly wasn't invited, but I did -- I was checking 5 the record actually for this, because I saw what -- 6 George Eustice did a brilliant job working for me, I saw 7 what he wrote. But looking at the record of the 8 meetings I had and the amount of activity we were doing 9 trying to win over and win support of newspapers 10 including, I think, you know, actually flying off to 11 meet the owners of the Telegraph, as I say, I don't 12 think I would characterise it as one approach and then 13 a different approach. I think there's slightly more 14 similarity between the two. 15 I think there's one other thing maybe to say, which 16 was at the beginning of my leadership, a lot of what 17 I was trying to do was make changes to the Conservative 18 Party, to the policies of the party, the approach of the 19 party. Not all of these were very popular with the 20 Conservative press, so I had a difficulty in trying to 21 make changes to the Conservative Party while at the same 22 time convince the Conservative press I was doing the 23 right thing. 24 Q. But some have identified a change of tack, as it were, 25 in around 2007, rightly or wrongly, and that flows from 48 1 the fact that you didn't have widespread support in the 2 media. It's fair to say in paragraph 196 of your 3 statement that you say you didn't have widespread 4 support at the time you became leader of the opposition. 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. But that may have continued until about 2007. Is that 7 a reasonable analysis or not? 8 A. Yes, I think it is. Some of that, as I say, was because 9 I was making these changes to the Conservative Party, 10 but also I did, I think, progressively realise over 11 2006, 2007, that it's very difficult if you're running 12 a political party and you're trying to win over the 13 public, you're trying to create momentum, it's quite 14 difficult if you don't have what I would call sort of 15 the different bits of the Conservative family behind 16 you. You need your MPs supporting you, your MEPs, your 17 councillors, your members, and you also need those parts 18 of the Conservative press that should be sort of getting 19 behind you. And I had this situation where some quite 20 Conservative parts of the press -- I just wasn't really 21 getting much backing from them and I was -- frankly 22 I think I was sort of struggling a bit to get the 23 message across. 24 So I think I've put in a lot of work already but 25 maybe I'll put in some more work. 49 1 Q. Your exhibit DC2, Mr Cameron, which is under tab 3 of 2 this bundle, this collects together the meetings you've 3 had with media figures as leader of the opposition. 4 You're not putting it forward as a certificate in the 5 sense that you can't guarantee that every single meeting 6 is here and we understand that. 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. For what it's worth, over four years and five months of 9 opposition, we've counted 1,404 entries, which equates 10 to around 26 meetings or interviews per month, which is 11 more than one every weekday. It's fair to say, though, 12 in government there have been fewer. It works out at 13 about 13 a month, so it's 50 per cent of the time you 14 lavished on this in opposition. 15 A. As I say, when I was elected, I did try to do less of 16 this and try to have more of a distance, try to make 17 sure -- because genuinely when you're in opposition, 18 what are you doing? You're campaigning, you're drawing 19 up policies, you're trying to convince people. In 20 government, it is and should be different. You should 21 be spending your time governing, not talking about 22 governing, so I did try to create some more distance, 23 but as I explained earlier I think it's very difficult 24 because of these daily battles that you fight. 25 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Do you think that there's 50 1 a problem -- just if I interpose, you're talking about 2 the difference between opposition and government. You 3 may be aware that Mr Alastair Campbell made the point 4 that he felt that New Labour had made a mistake taking 5 approaches adopted in opposition and running with them 6 in government. Not everybody has agreed with that, but 7 I'd be interested to know whether you think there is 8 a difference, because whatever system one puts into 9 place, it's quite difficult if it's not recognised as 10 appropriate by both or all main parties. 11 A. Yes. I think it's right that in government you're 12 making real decisions rather than just policy ideas and 13 campaigns, so it's more important that what you do is 14 done properly. And that's why you have special 15 advisers' codes, ministerial codes and all the rest of 16 it. But I do think there is -- when you're leader of 17 the opposition, and I did the job for five years, it's 18 only in the last year you get the sort of Civil Service 19 machine starting to talk to you about how you'd 20 translate your structure and your processes into Number 21 10 Downing Street, and I think there could be a strength 22 in -- I don't believe in having a sort of official 23 opposition office, as it were, but I think there could 24 be a strength in having earlier discussions between the 25 Cabinet Secretary or the Permanent Secretary at 51 1 Number 10 with a new leader of the opposition, just to 2 make them aware of some of the processes and practices 3 that might assist them in the work that they do and 4 avoiding any conflicts and the rest of it. 5 So that is something I -- perhaps we can write to 6 your Inquiry about. 7 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, that's very much along the lines 8 that I was thinking about, that if practices develop 9 that aren't appropriate for government, it might be 10 better -- I appreciate that opposition and government is 11 very different, for the reasons that you've identified, 12 but if good practice can be developed while in 13 opposition, it will flow naturally into government, but 14 if an opposition party are developing ideas without the 15 experience of having been in government, it becomes much 16 more difficult. 17 A. I'm sure that's right. 18 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: So I think that may be of value to 19 try and deal, at least in part, with the issue. 20 MR JAY: Given the very significant amount of time devoted 21 to media engagement, to what extent did those demands 22 get in the way you think with policy formulation and 23 leadership? 24 A. I don't think they were so extensive that you didn't 25 have time to do the other things leaders of the 52 1 opposition do. We had huge policy commissions that were 2 starting from scratch, drawing up new policies. I had 3 a very active programme of campaigning around the 4 country. I did a huge number of what I call Cameron 5 Directs, which were public meetings all over the 6 country. 7 So it takes up a lot of time and there are moments 8 when you think these are hours of your life you're not 9 going to get back, but if you're a politician and you're 10 leading a political party and you want to win people 11 over, you need to get your message across. 12 Q. In government in particular, although obviously you have 13 a fuller day job, does the same point apply? Do you 14 feel that media engagement less, true it is, in 15 government than it has been in opposition, has intruded 16 in policy formulation, leadership and governing? 17 A. It shouldn't, but it can. I think the way I've 18 explained the 24-hour news agenda, when I arrived in 19 Downing Street, I did think that the set-up was quite 20 geared to 24-hour news. It felt too much like 21 a newsroom, and that's what the press department should 22 be like, but you have to try and create a structure and 23 a private office and a set of arrangements where you can 24 think, take decisions, prepare for decisions properly, 25 structure your day so you're not permanently in a sort 53 1 of news warfare mode, if I can put it that way. 2 Q. Looking at this list, which of course extends over 3 a number of pages and starts at 04198, we've pored over 4 it and attempted to do all sorts of statistical analyses 5 but confess to have come to the conclusion that that 6 would be misleading for a number of reasons, so we're 7 not going to bore you with those analyses. 8 Just pick up a couple of points, though, that we've 9 identified for Mr Rupert Murdoch 10 entries, 10 Mr James Murdoch 15, and for Rebekah Brooks 19. In 11 relation to her, does that cover all social interactions 12 or not? 13 A. This is for the period when I was in opposition? 14 Q. Yes. 15 A. What we did for this -- the short answer is it might 16 not, because what we did for this was go back over the 17 diaries for all the time I was leader of the opposition, 18 try and work out whether we had missed anything out, but 19 it doesn't always include -- I mean, for instance, at 20 the weekend, my diary wouldn't cover my weekends 21 necessarily, so there could be other meetings in there 22 that I haven't identified. 23 Going through some of our other participants' 24 meetings, we found some that didn't tally with us and 25 ours didn't -- we've been through and we've tried to 54 1 reconcile as much as possible, but inevitably you have 2 some where -- I think in government it's different 3 because certainly in the office you have a diary, 4 I think John Major explained this, a diary of what 5 you're meant to do that day and then a diary of what 6 actually happened that day. So the government ones in 7 office I'm pretty confident about. The opposition ones 8 was our best attempt, but it may have gaps. 9 MR JAY: We're going to leave it to others if so advised to 10 do their own comparative analysis. We haven't missed 11 the point that Mr Murdoch's list doesn't quite match 12 yours, but frankly it's an arid comparison in our view. 13 We're going to leave it there. 14 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's clearly a mistake to 15 overexaggerate the importance or accuracy of these 16 documents. These are best efforts in retrospect from 17 records which were never intended to provide 18 a historically accurate account of what you were doing. 19 So it would be a mistake to try and do that analysis. 20 What you do is you create a picture, and the picture, it 21 seems to me, is sufficient for the purposes of the 22 Inquiry. 23 A. Yes. 24 MR JAY: Before we break, Mr Cameron, may I just alight on 25 one item, please? 16 August 2008, which is page 04220. 55 1 We see dinner here with Elisabeth Murdoch, Rebekah Wade 2 and Matthew Freud. 3 A. Mm. 4 Q. Was that part of the Santorini visit, which we believe 5 it to be? 6 A. I don't have the date of the Santorini visit on me, but 7 it must be in my evidence somewhere, so if we 8 cross-check, I'm sure we can find that out. It looks 9 like it was. 10 Q. Yes, it is. 11 A. Page 67 of my evidence. 12 Q. It is, Mr Cameron. Paragraph 200. 13 A. Right, got it. Okay. Yes. 14 Q. Can I just ask you, please, Mr Rupert Murdoch wasn't at 15 the dinner then; is that correct? 16 A. No, I think he was at the dinner. I don't think this 17 is -- I'm extremely sorry, I don't think that is right. 18 Q. Okay. 19 A. I think you've spotted an error, for which I'm very 20 sorry. 21 Q. I'm not saying it's the biggest point but I just wanted 22 to check. 23 A. No, no, it looks like -- I deal with it in my evidence, 24 because -- at 199, 200, 201. Basically, this was -- my 25 memory was that this was drinks and then a dinner, but 56 1 I think the dinner was everyone who was there, including 2 the people listed in DC2, but I think Rupert Murdoch was 3 there, yes. 4 MR JAY: Sir, is that a convenient moment? 5 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, certainly. 6 Prime Minister, we have a break to give the 7 shorthand writer a few minutes off. 8 A. Very good. 9 (11.19 am) 10 (A short break) 11 (11.29 am) 12 MR JAY: Mr Cameron, may we look at some individual entries 13 in your schedule, DC2. We're not going to look at that 14 many. First of all, 16 December 2005, which is our 15 page 04198, Matthew and Elisabeth Freud. It says 16 "Social". Does one deduce that they're friends of 17 yours? 18 A. Yes. Matthew Freud I must have known for some 20 years. 19 He married someone I was at university with, his first 20 wife, so I've known him since then. So yes, I'm trying 21 to find the page, but I think it was a social occasion. 22 Q. And Elisabeth Freud, obviously nee Murdoch, how long 23 have you known her? 24 A. I suppose since they got married, but I can't put a date 25 on it. 57 1 Q. The first meeting here with Rupert Murdoch is 18 January 2 2006. As your witness statement makes clear, there was 3 an earlier encounter in October 2005 before you were 4 leader. Can I ask you, please, about 1 February 2006, 5 "Paul Dacre, Daily Mail, drinks". It's unfair to ask 6 you on one particular occasion which was six years ago, 7 but do you think that was a one-on-one or there were 8 other people there? 9 A. I don't remember because it was a long time ago, but the 10 meetings I've had with Paul Dacre, I would say most of 11 them have probably been a one-on-one drink, occasionally 12 a lunch. He has done some where there have been a range 13 of journalists from the Daily Mail, I remember one or 14 two of those, but a mixture, but I think some 15 one-on-ones, yes. 16 Q. If one were to look at one other with Mr Dacre, 17 18 December 2006, which is page 04205. It's a dinner, 18 actually. It's about the time that the Information 19 Commissioner's second report came out. Again, 20 I understand it's difficult to search one's 21 recollection, but do you recall whether that report 22 might have been discussed then or not? 23 A. I don't remember, I'm afraid. I can't even remember 24 where the dinner was. I think also he's had dinner in 25 my home as well. The trouble with that one is I can't 58 1 remember where it was, let alone what we talked about. 2 Q. And then the Santorini visit at page 04220, can I just 3 understand, whose idea was that? 4 A. I think it was Matthew Freud's idea. I think he phoned 5 me about it. So I think it was his idea, yes. 6 Q. Did he have a discussion with Rebekah Wade about it, to 7 your knowledge? 8 A. I don't know, no. 9 Q. Do you know why that visit came about or what its 10 purpose was? 11 A. Well, from my point of view, it was just an opportunity 12 to try to get to know Rupert Murdoch better. Obviously 13 I was trying to win over his newspapers and put across 14 my opinions, so for me it was just an opportunity to try 15 and build that relationship. 16 It was quite a long way to go and all of that, but 17 it seemed a good opportunity. 18 Q. So presumably there was an earlier conversation or there 19 had been earlier conversations with Mr Freud as to the 20 possibility of having this sort of meeting; is that 21 correct? 22 A. My memory is it came together quite quickly. I seem to 23 remember I was on some tour day around the country. 24 I got a call or a text from Matthew. I was just about 25 to go off to Georgia, to visit Georgia at the time of 59 1 the Russian invasion, and it just seemed like a possible 2 opportunity to link up and -- but I seem to remember it 3 all came together very quickly at the last minute, but 4 I might have got it wrong. 5 Q. We know that Rebekah Wade was there, but did you have 6 a conversation with her about this before you flew out 7 or not? 8 A. I don't recall that, I'm afraid. 9 Q. In 2009, Mr Cameron, 3 May, you had lunch with 10 James Murdoch. This is page 04225. 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Would you think it's possible on that occasion that you 13 discussed regulatory issues, including Ofcom and the 14 BBC? 15 A. Well, I don't recall what was discussed directly at the 16 lunch. I'm sure that over the years I've discussed some 17 of those issues with James Murdoch. He has very strong 18 views on them, I have very strong views, they're not 19 really the same views, and I'm sure we would have had 20 discussions about it. Perhaps particularly -- well, 21 I think probably on both. I don't recall the specifics, 22 but I'm sure we must have discussed our views. 23 Q. This was a few months before his MacTaggart lecture, 24 which was delivered in late August 2009. 25 A. Mm. 60 1 Q. Did you have any discussions with him about the subject 2 matter of that lecture, either before he gave it or 3 afterwards? 4 A. Not to my memory, no. I think these would have been -- 5 you know, as I say, most of these meetings were really 6 about me trying to promote Conservative policy, the 7 Conservative approach and the rest of it, but sometimes, 8 because I'm interested in media issues and have 9 longstanding views on them, sometimes I'm sure we would 10 have discussed them. 11 Q. One can see the intensity of his feeling, if I can put 12 it in those terms, from the text of the lecture itself. 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. He expresses himself quite strongly, doesn't he? 15 A. Yes. And there are lots of things of that nature 16 I don't particularly agree with. I've always believed 17 in a strong BBC funded by the licence fee. I think 18 Ofcom does have an important role. I think as I put in 19 my evidence Ofcom got overbloated and overbig and 20 needed, like other quangos, to be reduced in scale, but 21 both have an important role. 22 Q. In September 2009, page 04228, you had lunch with 23 Mr Dominic Mohan of the Sun on 1 September 2009. 24 A. Mm-hm. 25 Q. Again, to alight on any particular occasion is possibly 61 1 unfair, but do you think on that occasion the issue of 2 support of the Sun for you and your party was discussed 3 or not? 4 A. I wouldn't -- I don't recall. By this stage obviously 5 I was making arguments that Sun readers were coming over 6 to the Conservatives and our approach was what the 7 country needed and all the rest of it, but I don't 8 remember the specifics of that conversation, no. 9 Q. To be fair to you, so that we see the overall picture, 10 there are a lot of references to Nick Robinson on this 11 page and elsewhere. He's someone that you keep in 12 contact with for obvious reasons. 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Can I go to 10 September 2009. It's described as drinks 15 with James Murdoch. That was at the George, wasn't it? 16 A. Yes. This is the page -- are we still on 229? 17 Q. It's 04228, actually. 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. The evidence has been that it was on that occasion that 20 he told you that the Sun would support the Conservative 21 Party. Do you remember that? 22 A. Yes, I do remember that. That was -- I do remember him 23 saying that. I remember the conversation -- well, some 24 of the conversation we had, yes. 25 Q. How long was the conversation, approximately? 62 1 A. Not particularly long. Might have been half an hour, 40 2 minutes. It was a drink and a catch-up, but it was -- 3 he wanted to tell me that the Sun was going to support 4 the Conservatives and he told me, I think, from my 5 memory, that it was going to happen around the time of 6 the Labour conference, and I remember obviously being 7 pleased that the Conservative Party was going to get the 8 Sun's support, and I think we had a conversation about 9 other policy issues at the time. That's my memory of 10 it. 11 Q. So he gave you some inkling of the timing that this was 12 going to break? 13 A. I think so. That's my memory of it, yes. Perhaps not 14 the precise timing, but I think they were probably still 15 debating it, but I seem to remember there was sort of 16 the hint it was going to be some time in Labour's 17 conference. 18 Q. Did he identify which aspects of your policy constituted 19 the reasons for his newspapers, or in particular the 20 Sun, wanting to support your party? 21 A. I think at the time a lot of the focus was on the 22 economy, because obviously we were in the midst of all 23 the economic difficulties and we were setting out very 24 clearly that it was important for Britain to get on top 25 of its debt and its deficit and all the rest of it, so 63 1 I do remember discussing economic issues, yes. I think 2 that's right. 3 Q. On that occasion, do you recall any mention being made 4 by James Murdoch of your policies in relation to the BBC 5 and Ofcom? 6 A. I don't recall that, and I think it unlikely. I think 7 that this was -- he was very keen to tell me directly 8 that the Sun was going to support the Conservatives, 9 that he felt on the big economic judgment about what 10 Britain needed we had the right argument, the government 11 had the wrong argument, and my memory is that's what the 12 conversation was about. 13 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, you said you had a conversation 14 about other policy issues? 15 A. Yes, he has lots of enthusiasms that aren't about the 16 media. He's particularly enthusiastic about defence. 17 He takes the view we should have at least six aircraft 18 carriers, I think at last count, rather than two, so he 19 has lots of enthusiasms and I'm sure we discussed some 20 of those, but the key -- my memory is, and it's 21 difficult to recall all of these events, I definitely 22 remember him saying the Sun was going to support the 23 Conservative Party. I wouldn't forget that. I think he 24 gave me a hint of the timing, and my memory is it was 25 mostly about the big economic picture, because that was 64 1 the key issue of the day. 2 MR JAY: This was within about two weeks of his MacTaggart 3 lecture. Had you out of interest read his lecture 4 before 10 September 2009? 5 A. No. 6 Q. Had the gist of it been drawn to your attention? 7 A. I read -- after it was delivered I would have seen the 8 press reports, but I don't remember reading the whole 9 thing at the time. I've read it subsequently in 10 preparation for all of this, but as I say, he had very 11 strong views. Some of these views I didn't agree with, 12 and on things like the BBC, you know, we had a very 13 clear position which dates right back to my time at 14 Carlton, that the BBC is the cornerstone of British 15 broadcasting, you need to have a licence fee, and as 16 I say, Ofcom, while bloated, it had an important role. 17 Q. But just some might say that Ofcom and the BBC were the 18 bête noire of Mr James Murdoch, he'd expressed himself 19 very forcibly in the lecture, this is within two weeks 20 of the lecture, it's more than plausible that he might 21 have unburdened himself about those matters to you on 22 this one occasion. Do you think that might have 23 happened? 24 A. I don't think so, because, as I say, I think the main -- 25 you know, this was sort of -- I think for the Sun it was 65 1 a big change, and I remember it being about economic 2 policy. That's my memory of it. 3 Q. Okay, 21 September, we can see from the bottom of the 4 page there's dinner, you, James Murdoch and 5 Rebekah Brooks. It's obviously a social occasion now. 6 But can you remember anything about whether political 7 issues, perhaps regulatory issues were discussed on that 8 occasion? 9 A. I don't particularly recall what was discussed then, no. 10 Q. But the upcoming support of the Sun is likely to have 11 been mentioned, isn't it? 12 A. Yes. I think I'm trying to remember the exact date of 13 the Labour conference. 14 Q. I think we're onto about 27 or 28 September. 15 A. Right. I expect that would have been discussed. In 16 terms of what the Sun was going to do, it was -- but 17 I don't -- I remember the drink, I remember what he said 18 about the Sun supporting the Conservatives. I don't 19 particularly remember the dinner. 20 Q. Rightly or wrongly, the Sun had timed it for maximum 21 political damage to Mr Brown's government, that goes 22 without saying. 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. It seems at least plausible again that that sort of 25 point was discussed on this occasion. Would you agree? 66 1 A. As I say, I recall the drink, I don't recall the dinner. 2 Q. Okay. The announcement I think was the evening of 3 28 September, or it might have been the 29th, it's not 4 going to matter for our purposes today. If you look at 5 04229, there are then a series of interactions with the 6 Sun. An interview, George Passcoe-Watson, 1 October. 7 Dinner, Dominic Mohan and Mr Passcoe-Watson again 8 5 October. Interview with the Sun, 5 October. 9 Breakfast, News of the World 7 October. Dinner, 10 Irwin Stelzer at the Times 21 October, and then 11 breakfast, 2 November, James Murdoch and Rebekah Brooks. 12 So there's quite a lot of activity with 13 News International in the month or so following. 14 A. I would just, for anyone who's not on page 4229, point 15 out there was also dinner with the Telegraph, meetings, 16 interviews with Radio Manchester, Scottish television, 17 the BBC, ITV. This was the party conference. This was 18 an incredibly busy media week, where I was meeting all 19 sorts of people from all sorts of different media 20 organisations. I just want to make that point. 21 Q. Yes. 22 A. Including Lord Rothermere, the whole team at the Mail on 23 Sunday, et cetera, et cetera. 24 Q. That's a very fair point, Mr Cameron. I didn't mean to 25 occlude that one. 67 1 Can we move forward to 15 December 2009, which is 2 the bottom of 04231. That seems to be the first meeting 3 you had with Rupert Murdoch after the Sun's support had 4 changed. Can you remember anything about that 5 conversation, particularly about the change of support? 6 A. Not particularly. I mean, in most of my lunches or 7 breakfasts with Rupert Murdoch, the conversation has 8 always been predominantly about economic issues, 9 security geopolitical issues, he was very interested in 10 what was happening in Afghanistan, very interested in 11 global markets. 12 I think it's -- of course all businesses have their 13 interests and the rest of it, but in my dealings with 14 Rupert Murdoch, most of the conversation has been about 15 big international political issues. 16 Q. The only other point on this schedule, it's quite 17 a small point, we see you on 28 January 2010 at 18 page 04232, there's dinner, Will Lewis of the Daily 19 Telegraph, Frederic Michel, News Corporation, 20 James Harding of the Times, Robert Peston obviously of 21 the BBC. Was that the only occasion that you met with 22 Mr Michel? 23 A. This is bottom of 4232? 24 Q. That's right. 25 A. This was in Davos and this is a dinner I've held pretty 68 1 much every year I've been going. I think this is what 2 this refers to. I definitely met Fred Michel there. 3 I think I have also probably met him at some of the 4 News International parties, but I think that's probably 5 about it. 6 Q. And of course you're aware of his role and -- 7 A. I've read a lot of texts, yes. 8 Q. Mm. 9 A. Well, I have now, as it were. 10 Q. In relation to your schedule when you're Prime Minister, 11 this is now DC1, it starts at 04182, what we see by way 12 of summary is a lesser degree of contact. It's about 13 50 per cent -- 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. -- we think. And the same sort of picture, in terms of 16 the individuals you meet, coming up. 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. So I don't think it's necessary to look at this with any 19 care unless there are any particular points you want to 20 draw attention to. 21 A. No. I'd just make the point, I suppose, that again if 22 you look at arrival on Downing Street, there are 23 meetings with a lot of different newspapers and 24 newspaper groups. But as you say, a less intense 25 period. I had other important things to do. 69 1 Q. Can I ask you, moving away from this and towards someone 2 else, Mr Aidan Barclay. 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. We've heard some evidence from him and I hope you've had 5 the chance to look at the transcript of his evidence 6 under tab 27 of this bundle, but he referred to the fact 7 that he had quite frequent text messages with you, you'd 8 exchanged phone numbers. Indeed, we've seen evidence of 9 some of those messages. It's the transcript for Day 62, 10 in particular, it's in the afternoon, pages 83 to 87. 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. We know from one text message, and some of these are of 13 a personal nature, it's therefore not necessary to look 14 at them, but there's one message at the start of tab 25, 15 which is page PROP03106. 16 A. Right. 17 Q. Where there's a reference to "him". I'm just trying to 18 be sure who the pronoun "him" is a reference to in that. 19 I think it's -- 20 A. Are we on the texts themselves or on the -- oh, here we 21 are, we have it on the screen. 22 Q. This is an SMS text send by "AB", who is obviously 23 Mr Barclay, to you, 23 March 2010. 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. The campaign hasn't yet been launched, but it's about to 70 1 be: 2 "Spoken to Tony ..." 3 That's Tony Gallagher, isn't it? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. "... and repeated our conversation. Asked him to be in 6 touch to arrange daily call during campaign as 7 discussed." 8 I think the evidence was that the daily call was 9 going to be between you and Mr Barclay, but if that's 10 wrong, I'll be corrected. 11 A. I don't think so. I think the daily call was between 12 the Conservative Party and Tony Gallagher. I don't know 13 whether it was necessarily going to be me, but I think 14 this was me wanting to make sure that the Telegraph knew 15 our policies and our plans and all the rest of it. 16 I think that's what it was about. 17 Q. I understand. As I said, some the texts are about 18 social arrangements, but there are some texts about 19 liquidity. This is much later on in May 2011. Just to 20 have a look at one of them, it's at 03112, Mr Cameron. 21 A. Yes. Okay. 22 Q. This is quite a recondite area: 23 "Suggest therefore Bank of England announce 24 extension to liquidity scheme allow banks say 5 yrs to 25 implement Basle 3 and if you can scrap talk of bank tax 71 1 other countries won't go along with it anyway." 2 And I think you do reply to that, or maybe you 3 don't. There's another one about credit markets. 4 Is the overall impression here that he has access to 5 you in a particular way? 6 A. Well, I think we had met various times, we had each 7 other's phone numbers. I think he -- you know, he felt 8 particularly strongly about some of these economic 9 issues and wanted to give me his view. I don't think 10 there's anything particularly improper about that. 11 Q. No. But did you -- put another way, did you accord any 12 particular weight to his view or was it just part of the 13 whole range of viewpoints you receive probably on 14 a multitudinous basis over the course of a working day? 15 A. Yes. I think this was the view of him, you know, not 16 really as chairman of a newspaper group but as chairman 17 of a big business heavily invested into the UK with lots 18 of property and other businesses and this was his strong 19 views about the financial situation and I think it's 20 perfectly legitimate. I get a lot of exposure to 21 businesses' views on these sorts of points, some by 22 text, many more by the meetings I have, and that seems 23 to me not a bad thing, as long as you can order them 24 properly in your mind. 25 Q. So in order to get a fair picture, are we to understand 72 1 that you are almost bombarded with this sort of 2 material, not necessarily from media sources but 3 generally people trying to get you to look at things to 4 at least consider them as part of policy formulation? 5 A. I wouldn't say bombarded, but you have a lot of contacts 6 with a lot of different people in different ways, so 7 I've actually sort of slightly moved away from email in 8 some ways, because I do my official papers and box and 9 everything very formally, but I do get texts from 10 business contacts, friends and what have you. 11 Q. May I go back to the issue now of the Sun newspaper. 12 We, I think, agree that it can't be seen as of massive 13 importance, but it is of some importance -- 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. -- where it goes, as I suppose a form of floating voter, 16 is that a reasonable characterisation? 17 A. I think that's right. It certainly doesn't mean you're 18 going to win the election, but you're trying to win 19 support, build momentum, so it's that. 20 Q. Did you develop a strategy as to how the Sun might be 21 won over? 22 A. I wouldn't put it like that, no. I think we developed 23 a strategy of how to explain the values and the policies 24 and the approaches we believed in and then tried to 25 spread that as far as we could. Obviously when you're 73 1 talking to the Sun, you want to talk to things -- those 2 parts of your policy that are particularly going to 3 appeal to Sun readers, so the freeze in the council tax 4 we thought was particularly important because people 5 were hard pressed, they're having a difficult time, that 6 is something that people really can feel strongly about 7 because they know the pressure their family finances are 8 under. So obviously, you know, when you're talking to 9 the Financial Times, you're going to be talking about 10 Basle 3, but when you're talking to the Sun, you want to 11 talk about the policies you have that directly appeal to 12 their readers. 13 Q. By this stage you of course had Mr Coulson on board, 14 since May or June 2007, and -- I'll come to this in more 15 detail later -- you had developed a friendship with 16 Mrs Brooks, hadn't you? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. And you were aware that Mr Rupert Murdoch had a good 19 personal relationship with Mr Brown, were you? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. And was it explained to you or did you work it out 22 anyway that that was likely to be an impediment, if 23 I can put it in those terms, to the Sun shifting sides? 24 A. I think both that Rupert Murdoch had a strong 25 relationship with Gordon Brown; Rebekah Brooks, Rebekah 74 1 Wade as then was, had a strong relationship with 2 Gordon Brown. I knew that we had our work cut out to 3 win over the Sun, yes, but I felt what we had on our 4 side was that Sun readers were leaving the government 5 and coming towards us, and so I thought -- as I said 6 right throughout, our task was to try to get what I see 7 as a sort of centre right, pro-enterprise, pro-family, 8 small "c" conservative paper back into the fold. 9 Q. Was it your understanding that the final decision would 10 be made by Rupert Murdoch, or at the very least it 11 couldn't be made without his consent? 12 A. I didn't know how these decisions -- I assumed obviously 13 he would have a big say in it but I sensed that if we 14 could show that Sun readers were moving in 15 a Conservative direction, we would have a good chance of 16 winning their support, but as I said, this was one of 17 many things we were trying to do. 18 Q. Did Mr Coulson give you advice as to how best to proceed 19 in relation to the Sun? 20 A. Well, of course. He was my Director of Communications 21 and so he was in charge of taking our policies and 22 working out the best way of promoting my leadership, our 23 policies, our values, what we could do for the country, 24 to all of these media outlets. 25 Q. And you knew, of course, that he was very friendly with 75 1 Mrs Brooks, didn't you? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. And you said Mrs Brooks was close to Gordon Brown. 4 Wouldn't be perhaps better to say that she was close to 5 his wife, but in fact she was very friendly with 6 Tony Blair and less well disposed to Gordon Brown, if 7 I can summarise it in those terms? 8 A. I think she was pretty friendly with all of them, and 9 I remember some strong arguments when I would be 10 berating the government and all its works and she would 11 be standing up pretty vigorously for Gordon Brown. 12 Q. When did you sense that Mrs Brooks would be disposed to 13 supporting you and your party, approximately when? 14 A. I can't really put a date on it. I think it was -- as 15 I say, there was a growing picture of disenchantment 16 with the government. The Conservative Party was, 17 I think, getting its act together, looking more like 18 a credible government, and it was a process. We had 19 some strong allies, as it were. I don't want to ruin 20 his career, but someone like Trevor Kavanagh on the Sun, 21 I felt that he was someone who thought that the Labour 22 government was getting it wrong, thought the 23 Conservative Party was getting its act together. Lots 24 of things he didn't agree with about what I was doing, 25 but I always felt he was a potential ally for pointing 76 1 out that Sun readers were moving in our direction. 2 Q. I'm sure it's a process, not an event; in any event, if 3 it is an event you're not going to remember the exact 4 date, but approximately when do you think Mrs Brooks was 5 onside? About six months before the shift of support? 6 A year before? 7 A. I would have to go through my diary and try and remember 8 the -- but I can't give you a date. 9 Q. Not even a sense of when it might have been, in terms 10 of -- I'm not asking you to give us a date, but was it 11 months, was it weeks, was it years? 12 A. I don't want to get it wrong, so I -- it certainly 13 wasn't weeks. It was I think more than that. But 14 I can't really give you any more than that. 15 Q. Were you given any advice as to the importance of 16 James Murdoch in this discretion, that he would have 17 influence over his father and, put bluntly, may be able 18 to draw his father away from Gordon Brown? 19 A. I think they were all important. I mean, I didn't quite 20 understand. It was like -- the Sun likened it to the 21 white smoke coming out after a papal election. 22 I didn't quite understand how the decision would be 23 made, but my view was they were all important in terms 24 of making that decision. The Sun readers trusted voices 25 like Trevor Kavanagh, Rupert Murdoch, James Murdoch, 77 1 Rebekah Wade, Dominic Mohan, all of them, and I felt 2 I had to focus on showing how the Conservative Party 3 would be good for the country, good for Sun readers, and 4 we had a chance of as I say winning them back to the 5 Conservative fold and that's what I focused on. 6 Q. How important were the Freuds in all of this, if not as 7 decision-makers but as facilitators? 8 A. Very difficult. I mean, Matthew's politics I'm not 9 quite sure about. So I'm not totally sure -- I don't 10 want to -- I'm not totally sure what role he was 11 playing, but he was being helpful in terms of trying to 12 facilitate a meeting here or some advice or something 13 like that. He's a friend, but I think politically he's 14 supported various different sides at various different 15 times. 16 Q. Okay. So Mrs Brooks, you make clear from your 17 statement, is a friend. 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. It may not again be possible to identify a date, but 20 would you have counted her or did you count her as 21 amongst your good friends, say, by 2008? 22 A. Yes. We were -- you know, we got to know each other 23 because of her role in the media, my role in politics, 24 but we struck up a friendship. That friendship grew, 25 even though she was at that stage still -- her paper was 78 1 still supporting Gordon Brown and as I say she was still 2 personally quite supportive of Gordon Brown and as I say 3 our relationship got stronger when she married Charlie 4 Brooks, who I've known for some time and who's 5 a neighbour. 6 Q. She gave us some evidence as to the, if I can put it in 7 this way, the quantity and tone of text messages. Can 8 I ask you this straightforward question: do you agree in 9 general with the gist of her evidence on that matter? 10 A. Yes, I think I do. 11 Q. And as for phone calls, I'm not asking you to count them 12 up, but approximately how often would you or did you 13 speak to her by phone, including by mobile phone? 14 A. In opposition, perhaps particularly sort of 2006, 2007, 15 not a huge amount. I mean, I always felt when I did 16 ring her, I always felt I was -- it felt like I was 17 telephoning a lot less than Gordon Brown, which 18 I thought was interesting, that he was the 19 Prime Minister and I was the leader of the opposition. 20 My sense was I was in contact a lot less than he was. 21 But I can't put numbers on it. 22 But certainly, you know, in 2006, 2007, not 23 necessarily every week, I don't think. 24 Q. Can we move it forward to 2008, 2009. Was there contact 25 by phone, say, on a weekly basis? 79 1 A. I think as we get closer to the election and the 2 decision of the Sun and also the wedding and she's moved 3 in to Charlie Brooks' house, which is very near where 4 I live in -- where we live in the constituency, then the 5 level of contact went up, and we saw each other socially 6 more. 7 Q. But about how frequently? 8 A. What date are we talking about? 9 Q. Well, we're in 2008, 2009, Mr Cameron. Just to get an 10 idea first of all of contact by telephone and then 11 social contact. 12 A. It's very difficult because I don't have a record and 13 I don't want to give you an answer that isn't right, so, 14 you know, sometimes I expect we would have been talking 15 to each other quite a bit, particularly around the time 16 perhaps of the wedding or when we were both in 17 Oxfordshire, we would have had more frequent contact. 18 Q. Okay. So when you're at your constituency at 19 weekends -- 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. -- did you see her every weekend or most weekends in the 22 period 2008, 2009? 23 A. Not every weekend. 24 Q. But most weekends? 25 A. In 2008, 2009? I'd have to check. I might be able to 80 1 go back and check, but I don't think every weekend. 2 I don't think most weekends. But it would depend. 3 Q. I don't think it's necessary to ask you to check, 4 because these questions aren't designed to be that 5 precise. It's just to get a feel. 6 A. Definitely we were -- particularly once she started 7 going out with Charlie Brooks, living a couple of miles 8 down the road, I was definitely seeing her more often 9 because my sort of friendship with Charlie and as 10 a neighbour and, you know, we -- Charlie and I played 11 tennis together and all sorts of other things, which I'm 12 sure we'll come on to, so that was why I was seeing more 13 of her. 14 Q. There's one text message which I'm going to invite you 15 to look at now. Before I do, I'm going to say something 16 about it. It's dated 7 October 2009. I'm not sure what 17 number it's been given in our system, but it's tab 35 of 18 the addendum bundle which has been prepared. 19 A. Right. 20 Q. I'm going to read it out, but before I do, I'm going to 21 say something about it. Do you have it to hand? 22 A. I have it, yes. 23 Q. I should make it clear before I read it out that 24 News International have recently disclosed a number of 25 other text messages between Mrs Brooks and Mr Cameron, 81 1 pursuant to a Section 21 request. A Section 21 request 2 is in fact an order under statute requiring people to 3 disclose material. Those relate to the period October 4 2009, May 2011 and June 2011. In the Inquiry's 5 judgment, all the other text messages I have referred to 6 are irrelevant to its terms of reference. That's why 7 we're only going to look at one. And News International 8 through their solicitors Linklaters have also explained 9 why text messages in other monthly periods are not 10 available, and their letter will be put on our website. 11 So the one we're looking at is 7 October 2009, which 12 I think is during the party conference? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. But it's certainly within eight or nine days or so of 15 the shift of support. It was sent by Mrs Brooks to you, 16 timed at 16.45 in the afternoon. The first line has 17 been redacted because it's on grounds of relevance, and 18 then she says: 19 "But seriously [which suggests that the first line 20 contains or might contain something of a jocular nature] 21 I do understand the issue with the Times. Let's discuss 22 over country supper soon. On the party it was because 23 I had asked a number of NI [that's obviously 24 News International] people to Manchester post 25 endorsement and they were disappointed not to see you. 82 1 But as always Sam was wonderful -- (and I thought it was 2 OE's that were charm personified!) I am so rooting for 3 you tomorrow not just as a proud friend but because 4 professionally we're definitely in this together! 5 Speech of your life? Yes he Cam!" 6 The "rooting for you tomorrow" was obviously you 7 were giving a speech probably at the party conference? 8 A. I think it was my party conference speech. I think -- 9 I can explain this email. The issue with the Times was 10 that at the party conference I had not been to the Times 11 party. The major newspaper groups tend to have big 12 parties at the party conference and they expect party 13 leaders, Cabinet ministers, Shadow Cabinet ministers to 14 go, and that would be the normal thing to do. The 15 Telegraph, the Times, others would do this. I hadn't 16 gone, and I think that was what this was about, and 17 I was apologising for that, and that would explain her 18 disappointment, as it were, if that helps. 19 Q. Just the phrase "but because professionally we're 20 definitely in this together", what was your 21 understanding of that? 22 A. I think that is about the Sun had made this decision to 23 back the Conservatives, to part company with Labour, and 24 so the Sun wanted to make sure it was helping the 25 Conservative Party put its best foot forward with the 83 1 policies we were announcing, the speech I was going to 2 make and all the rest of it, and I think that's what 3 that means. 4 Q. So the adverb "professionally" is covering the fact that 5 the Sun and you were bound together to some extent? 6 A. I think what it means is that we were, as she put it, we 7 were friends, but professionally, we as leader of the 8 Conservative Party and her in newspapers, we were going 9 to be pushing the same political agenda. 10 Q. And the "country supper" she refers to, sort of in 11 a forward-looking way, is that the sort of interaction 12 you often had with her? 13 A. Yes, as we were neighbours. 14 Q. Okay. Can I move forward in time to May 2011 to deal 15 with a discrete point. This relates to the McCanns. 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Were you asked by Mrs Brooks to support or indeed cause 18 to take place a review of the McCann case within the 19 Metropolitan Police? 20 A. I don't recall the exact provenance of this whole issue. 21 What I remember is that I had a meeting with Kate and 22 Gerry McCann as leader of the opposition, and anyone 23 who's met them or obviously read about the story, you 24 can't fail to be incredibly moved by what has happened 25 to them and all the efforts they've made to try and get 84 1 Madeleine back, and I followed this up as 2 Prime Minister, but I can't remember the exact 3 provenance of who called who and when, and what have 4 you, but I think it was -- the police clearly had played 5 a role in trying to keep the investigation going, and 6 the government has helped them with that. 7 Q. But in terms of any interaction between you and 8 Mrs Brooks, was it drawn to your attention that 9 Mrs Brooks went to see two of your special advisers, 10 I think on 11 May? 11 A. I don't recall. It might well have been. I don't 12 recall the exact conversations. I do recall, because 13 I can see what might lie behind the question, which is: 14 are you treating different investigations and campaigns 15 fairly? And I do remember actually, as Prime Minister, 16 consulting the Permanent Secretary at Number 10 about 17 the step that the police were about to take, backed by 18 the government, which was to provide some extra funding 19 for the investigation, and it was drawn to my attention 20 that there is a special Home Office procedure for 21 helping with particularly complex and expensive 22 investigations that's been used in various cases, and it 23 was going to be used in this case and he was satisfied 24 that that was -- that had been dealt with properly and 25 effectively. So it's an example, if you like, of the 85 1 importance of making sure these things are done properly 2 and I believe it was. 3 Q. But if I can put the point in this way, were you aware 4 of any pressure being put on you directly or indirectly 5 via Mrs Brooks to cause this review to take place? 6 A. Pressure? No, I wasn't aware of any pressure. 7 Q. Well, if it wasn't pressure, was any influence, then, 8 sought to be imposed? 9 A. Well, I mean clearly this was a very high-profile case, 10 and a case that a number of newspapers wanted to 11 champion because their readers wanted to champion it, 12 and obviously as government you have to think: are we 13 helping with this because there's media pressure or is 14 it genuine public pressure, is there a genuine case, are 15 we treating this fairly? And I did ask those questions 16 of the Permanent Secretary at Number 10, and so I think 17 we made an appropriate response. But I don't remember 18 any sort of specific pressure being put on me. I think 19 I'm right in saying the Home Secretary has given some 20 evidence on this as well. 21 Q. May I move on to a different topic. It is related to 22 earlier topics, but it sort of ties in with the implied 23 deal point. You may or may not have been following 24 Mr Gordon Brown's evidence, but he made a specific point 25 against you and your party, and therefore it's right 86 1 that you have the opportunity to deal with it. 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. He put it, to be fair to him, higher than implied deal. 4 He said that it was an express deal which you made with 5 either Rupert Murdoch or James Murdoch to, I paraphrase, 6 follow the line of MacTaggart: neuter Ofcom, trim back 7 the BBC, in exchange for News International supporting 8 your party. So that's the allegation. We'll look at 9 the detail, but I invite you first of all to respond to 10 it generally. 11 A. To respond generally, and frankly it is absolute 12 nonsense from start to finish. I think where it comes 13 from is obviously Gordon Brown was very angry and 14 disappointed that the Sun had deserted him, and as 15 a result, in my view, he has cooked up an entirely 16 specious and unjustified conspiracy theory to try and, 17 I don't know, justify his anger. 18 But I've taken the time to look through the 19 individual parts of policy that he points to, and in 20 almost every case it is complete nonsense. 21 Just to take a couple of examples, he makes the 22 point about the listing of sporting events and 23 particularly the Ashes, and actually it was the Labour 24 government, his government, that delisted the Ashes. He 25 makes a point about us taking a particular view on 87 1 product placement. Again, it was a Labour government 2 that started the process of changing the rules on 3 product placement under his oversight. 4 On the BBC, as I've argued before, my position on 5 the BBC is not the same as James Murdoch's position on 6 the BBC. I support the BBC, I support the licence fee. 7 So the Conservative Party, I think, will be 8 submitting a piece-by-piece response to this because it 9 is complete nonsense, but I'm very happy to go through 10 the individual parts. But, as I've said before, there 11 was no overt deal for support, there was no covert deal, 12 there were no nods and winks. There was a Conservative 13 politician, me, trying to win over newspapers, trying to 14 win over television, trying to win over proprietors, but 15 not trading policies for that support. And when you 16 look at the detail of this, as I say, it is complete 17 nonsense. 18 Q. Thank you. May we focus on two matters and sort of take 19 the highlights, because that's probably the sensible way 20 to deal with it. The highlights, if they can be so 21 described, are the Ofcom issue and the BBC issue. 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. It may be the easiest way to deal with this is to look 24 at paragraph 105 and following of your statement, 25 because you rightly say you've taken time to refer to 88 1 relevant parts of iterations of your party's policy when 2 in opposition. 3 I think we can look at paragraph 107, first of all, 4 which is a speech the then Shadow Culture Minister 5 Mr Vaizey gave January 2009, this is our page 04127. He 6 said: 7 "We were fans of the BBC." 8 On the next page: 9 "While we support the licence fee and believe it's 10 the best way to fund the BBC for the foreseeable future, 11 we believe the level of the licence fee is at the top 12 end of what is acceptable to the public." 13 So hinting there that the fee may have to be frozen. 14 A. Yes, and that is what we did. We froze the licence fee, 15 much to the anger of James Murdoch, who I think -- 16 I think the Chancellor George Osborne thought that it 17 should have been cut. So we had our own policy on the 18 BBC licence fee which I think has been fair and 19 reasonable to the BBC when other organisations have had 20 their budgets cut by considerably more. 21 So, again, this part of the conspiracy theory 22 I think has absolutely no weight at all. 23 Q. Although some might say you were not prepared to go as 24 far as Mr Murdoch to cut the fee, but you were prepared 25 to meet him part way along the way, is that fair? 89 1 A. I think it's quite difficult to argue, at a time when 2 you know if you get into government you're going to have 3 to be making spending reductions, that you're going to 4 see the BBC licence fee go up and up and up, and I think 5 we had a consistent and long-term argument, which very 6 much flowed from my own views formed at Carlton, that 7 the BBC needed to be strong, it needed the backing of 8 the licence fee. I do think the BBC had gone into areas 9 it shouldn't have done, and I mention that in some of my 10 evidence, but I think this is a fair settlement for the 11 BBC and it's certainly not one that James Murdoch 12 supported. 13 Q. In March 2009, this is clear from paragraph 109 at 14 page 04130, you made an announcement which was to the 15 effect that the licence fee would be frozen. 16 A. Mm-hm. 17 Q. Did that represent your policy then at all material 18 times between March 2009 and the election, at least as 19 regards the licence fee? 20 A. Well, I made that announcement in March 2009 and we have 21 delivered that -- we've delivered more than that policy 22 in government, yes. 23 By the way, it just caught my eye, paragraph 110. 24 If there was this great conspiracy to hand over BBC 25 policy to the Murdochs, it would seem to be quite 90 1 a strange choice for Jeremy Hunt to launch a review of 2 the creative industries -- this is paragraph 110 -- 3 chaired by former BBC Director General Greg Dyke. If 4 you wanted a sort of Murdoch conspiracy, you wouldn't 5 ask Greg Dyke, a prominent previous Labour supporter and 6 very successful Director General of the BBC, to carry 7 out the policy for you. It's just another reason why 8 I think this whole idea is -- 9 Q. Although Elisabeth Freud was part of the taskforce, 10 wasn't she? 11 A. That's true, but you can see the list on page 37 and 12 I would argue that is a pretty balanced list of people 13 from different parts of broadcasting media and 14 technology. But as I say, Greg Dyke is hardly 15 a shrinking violet and you wouldn't put him in charge if 16 you had some secret agenda. 17 Q. There are probably no shrinking violets on this 18 taskforce. We're not going to look at all the names, 19 but is it your position that we have a range of views 20 coming across from these individuals? 21 A. Yes. I think what we were trying to do here is assemble 22 a group of people that included radio, music, new media, 23 ITV, so a pretty good mix, actually, but as I say, the 24 person leading it was a former Director General of the 25 BBC, and I think that's significant. 91 1 Q. Can we look at Ofcom? You gave a speech on quangos, it 2 wasn't devoted solely to Ofcom at all. It's 3 paragraph 113, page 04132. 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. But you did make some points about Ofcom in two or three 6 paragraphs, didn't you? 7 A. I did. I think it's important to stress this was a big 8 speech on quangos. There was a sense that after 13 9 years of a Labour government, the quango state had got 10 very big. Quangos had become very powerful, the people 11 working on them had become extraordinarily well paid, 12 and this was a serious speech that I'd worked on with 13 people like Oliver Letwin to try and come up with, 14 instead of the normal guff that politicians do about 15 let's have a bonfire of the quangos, we were trying to 16 find a set of rules to apply to different quangos to see 17 whether they needed to exist or whether parts of them 18 could be folded back into government, and we set out 19 a series of questions which are in paragraph 113, and 20 then we applied that to a number of quangos. 21 As you say, a big speech about quangos. The Ofcom 22 part is only three paragraphs or so. 23 One of the reasons I picked Ofcom was because of my 24 own experience from television of remembering what the 25 Independent Television Commission had done, the ITC, the 92 1 precursor of Ofcom, and also remembering the sort of 2 levels of pay that there were in the ITC compared with 3 Ofcom, and I did think Ofcom was quite a good example of 4 a quango that had got too big, too expensive, and the 5 pay levels were pretty excessive. 6 I would just make the point -- I'll shut up in 7 a second -- but at this time Ofcom was being actually 8 roundly attacked on this basis by ITV, by the BBC, with 9 which it had almost nothing to do, and also by 10 commentators on the left of politics like Andrew 11 Rawnsley, who were all saying Ofcom seems to have got 12 too big and too bureaucratic. 13 So this was an agenda that was very linked to my own 14 views, not in any way proposed or dictated by others. 15 Q. The upshot was that Ofcom, you said, would cease to 16 exist as we know it, this is at the end of 17 paragraph 113: 18 "Its remit will be restricted to its narrow 19 technical enforcement roles [and that presumably covered 20 roles under the Enterprise Act in relation to assessing 21 plurality] but it will no longer play a role in making 22 policy." 23 Do you see that? 24 A. What our test was with all these quangos was to say that 25 policymaking on the whole should be done by departments 93 1 and be accountable to Parliament. We were making an 2 argument about quangos that was not just about cutting 3 costs, it was about accountability. It was about saying 4 that if policy is being made, that should be ministers 5 accountable to Parliament; if decisions that have to be 6 impartial, which is what Ofcom does, were their concern, 7 they should be carried out by independent 8 non-governmental bodies for all the reasons people would 9 understand. So it was a serious attempt to look at 10 quangos more broadly. 11 Q. To take the story forward, as it were, is this right, 12 that the reason this policy was not enacted was that in 13 the pragmatic realities of the Coalition government it 14 wasn't possible? 15 A. That's right. I wasn't involved in the detailed 16 negotiation of the Coalition agreement, but some 17 policies made it through, others didn't, and I suspect 18 this is one that we didn't get agreement on, but we have 19 taken action on pay levels in quangos and we have tried 20 to restrict them. 21 Q. You have denied that there was any implied deal. Can 22 I try and look at it in this way: do you feel, looking 23 back at this, that there is nonetheless a perception 24 that we had the coincidence of two things, at least in 25 terms of time: a shift in support and policies which 94 1 don't precisely match what we see in the MacTaggart 2 lecture, but are not a million miles from them, and the 3 public thinks or people think: well, there's some sort 4 of link between the two. This is a perception and it 5 flows from a cosy relationship? Do you accept at least 6 that much? 7 A. I think anyone reasonably looking at Conservative 8 policies and where they came from and why they existed 9 would see that they were driven by our values and our 10 approach and also my personal history with Carlton. So, 11 no, I don't really accept that. 12 I think there's a slight problem with this. If the 13 argument goes there was no covert deal, okay, there was 14 no evidence for that, and maybe there was no overt deal, 15 but nonetheless it all looks like there was a nod and 16 a wink, we do slightly get into sort of witchcraft 17 trials. How do you possibly prove that you're innocent 18 on that basis? 19 As I say, the best I can do is point to all of these 20 policies, explain where they came from, and I think 21 there's really good evidence that they were borne out of 22 proper Conservative thinking about the media, and 23 I think whether you're dealing with the BBC licence fee, 24 TV advertising, Ofcom, product placement, whether or not 25 the Ashes should be on free-to-air television or not, 95 1 there's very good Conservative explanations for the 2 positions that we hold. 3 Q. I understand, Mr Cameron. If the matter is investigated 4 at a public inquiry, it either happened or it didn't 5 happen. 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. So there was either a deal, however you define it or you 8 don't. The problem is if you don't have a public 9 inquiry, there are perceptions? 10 A. The public inquiry is excellent. I think this is 11 absolutely fulfilling the remit of what I wanted and 12 it's very important that alongside the appalling things 13 that happened to entirely innocent people that you've 14 looked at, the huge problem we have in terms of police 15 relations with media, it's absolutely right we get to 16 the bottom of the political/media relationship and how 17 to put it on a firmer footing. 18 But what I'm saying is not only was there no covert 19 deal, there was no overt deal and there wasn't nods and 20 winks. Policies that I produced that I'm very proud of 21 came from our beliefs, values, my history, my beliefs, 22 and they weren't dictated by anybody else. 23 Q. Thank you. I think I've probably covered that point. 24 I'm going to move on to another point then. 25 The third area of evidence is specific narrative 96 1 examples and the first one is Mr Andy Coulson. 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. You start that in your witness statement at 4 paragraph 219, page 04168. 5 A. Right. 6 Q. In terms of your wish list in early 2007, Mr Cameron, 7 were you looking for someone with tabloid experience? 8 A. Not necessarily, but I was looking for someone who was 9 a big hitter, and I was looking for someone who could 10 really cope with the huge media pressure that you're 11 under, and tabloid editors and leading executives on 12 a tabloid newspaper I think do have -- they bring 13 something that others wouldn't, and so there wasn't 14 a particular wish list, but it was trying to get the 15 right person with the right skills. 16 Q. Because without generalising too much about tabloid 17 editors, we're tending to look at people who are tough 18 and who are not going to blink under pressure, aren't 19 we? 20 A. I think that's right. There is a reason for that, which 21 is -- I'm not asking for tea and sympathy, but when 22 you're running a political party, the media pressures, 23 you know, a typical weekend, you might have -- you have 24 a policy problem over here, you have an MP expenses 25 scandal over here, you have a marriage breakdown over 97 1 there, you have some councillor enmeshed in some scandal 2 over here. It literally comes in on top of your head. 3 It's very fast, it's very furious, and you need someone 4 seriously good at handling it, and that to me was one of 5 the key qualifications. 6 I had this very good guy, George Eustice, who was 7 doing a good job. If I was going to bring someone in 8 above him, I wanted somebody who really would be able to 9 materially alter and improve the way we did things, 10 particularly in the face of this massive pressure you 11 face. 12 Q. To what extent were you looking at the example of 13 Alastair Campbell as being obviously politically in 14 a different place but the sort of man in terms of 15 temperament and robustness who would be of assistance to 16 you? 17 A. Not necessarily. I don't think, you know, 18 Alastair Campbell had -- he was much more political than 19 Andy Coulson, and I think in all sorts of ways there 20 were occasions when clearly he'd overstepped the role of 21 what he should have been doing. 22 Q. We've heard from Mr Osborne that a number of names were 23 considered. Aside from the one broadcaster who has been 24 mentioned, can you remember approximately how many names 25 were considered? 98 1 A. There were two or three others. I don't want to blight 2 their careers by naming them. There were two or three 3 other people we were looking at and one or two that 4 I met with. But, as I say, we decided to employ 5 Andy Coulson. 6 Q. Of the two or three others, were any from a broadsheet? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. And Mr Coulson, was he the only one from 9 News International or not, previously, of course? 10 A. No. I mean, this is difficult to -- there was someone 11 from a tabloid newspaper I think I'd talked to earlier 12 in the process, but I can't remember the exact dates, 13 but at the time at which we made the Andy Coulson 14 appointment, I think I'm right that he was the only 15 tabloid editor available. 16 Q. The initial interviews, if that's a correct description, 17 were carried out by others, as we know, but how many did 18 you see as part of this process? How many individuals? 19 A. How many people did I see? Obviously Guto Harri, who's 20 outed himself or been outed, I did have conversations 21 with him. There was someone senior from a broadsheet 22 newspaper. There was someone else very senior in the 23 BBC. There was this tabloid journalist. This will 24 obviously set an enormous guessing game going with our 25 friends in the media. I've lost count. I think that's 99 1 four people. 2 There may have been others suggested. I think the 3 situation was we had, as I say, in George Eustice a very 4 effective communicator. Clearly we needed -- we wanted 5 though to strengthen the operation. People are being 6 suggested and proposed all the time, but those four 7 I can remember personally talking to. 8 Q. And paragraph 225, Mr Cameron, you explain that 9 assurances were sought and obtained from Mr Coulson in 10 a meeting with Francis Maude and Ed Llewellyn; is that 11 correct? 12 A. That is my understanding, yes. 13 Q. Can we be clear, was that something that was 14 communicated to you in about March 2007, namely that 15 they had specifically asked for assurances and obtained 16 them? 17 A. Yes. Obviously Ed Llewellyn is my Chief of Staff, was 18 my Chief of Staff. When you're trying to hire someone 19 like this, you obviously have to keep matters very 20 tight, you don't want it to leak -- it did actually leak 21 eventually. So I would have talked to Edward about his 22 interview, yes. 23 Q. Mr Osborne's evidence was that he asked for and obtained 24 assurances. Were you aware of that? 25 A. I don't recall, but if George says that, I have no 100 1 reason to doubt it. I do, as I put into my evidence in 2 225, I remember the Edward Llewellyn issue. I suspect 3 George did the same thing. 4 Q. How important was Mr Osborne's advice in relation to 5 this process? Were you reliant on him or were you 6 forming your own judgment? 7 A. It was important. I mean, George and I work very 8 closely together. He thought this was a good idea, but 9 as I've said in Parliament and elsewhere, this was my 10 decision. I take full responsibility for it. And no, 11 I don't try and shuffle off any responsibility to 12 anybody else. 13 Q. In paragraph 237 of your statement, Mr Cameron, at 14 page 04172, you say that you are sure that you would 15 have discussed his appointment -- that's of course 16 Mr Coulson's appointment -- with Rebekah Wade. To be 17 clear, by this time it's May 2007, would you have 18 counted her as amongst your friends? 19 A. Yes. I think I would. As I say in the evidence, 20 I can't recall when I discussed it with her, whether it 21 was before, during or after, but I'm sure I would have 22 at some stage had a conversation with her about it. 23 Q. Can you remember how many conversations? 24 A. No. 25 Q. Might it have been more than one or not? 101 1 A. I don't think so. I mean, I -- the process was 2 George -- we'd both met him before. I'd met 3 Andy Coulson when he was editor of the News of the 4 World. We'd both formed the impression that he was 5 a very effective individual. George met him after he 6 had resigned as editor of the News of the World. I then 7 met him -- there were the interviews with Ed Llewellyn. 8 I then met him subsequently and I made the decision to 9 employ him. 10 But again I asked for these assurances as well, just 11 to be clear. It's in my evidence. 12 Q. I'm going to come to that. But in your discussions with 13 Mrs Brooks, were you, as it were, seeking some sort of 14 reference from her or was it far more informal? 15 A. I wasn't seeking a reference. I mean, when you're 16 employing someone like this who's been an editor of 17 a newspaper, you can't seek sort of formal references. 18 I'm sure I would have asked how effective he would be, 19 but this conversation may well have taken place after 20 I had made the decision. I can't recall exactly when 21 the conversation took place. But in the end it was my 22 decision. I was satisfied this was the right thing, to 23 have a former tabloid editor to help us with our media 24 and communications, and it was my decision. 25 Q. Sometimes discussions of this nature go into people's 102 1 character and integrity. Do you think you had 2 a discussion along those lines with Mrs Brooks about 3 Mr Coulson? 4 A. I'm afraid I don't -- I don't recall. But I think the 5 most important thing I would have wanted to know is 6 would he be good at the job. I was convinced he would 7 be, because, as I said, it's the massive pressures you 8 face, you need someone with those sorts of skills, so 9 I'm sure that's what I would have been thinking of. 10 Q. And I'm sure effectiveness is going to be a key 11 attribute, but character and integrity might also be 12 relevant, might they not? 13 A. Yes, of course. You're going to be working with this 14 person incredibly closely. You have to have 15 a relationship of trust with them. 16 Q. What if anything was Mrs Brooks' reaction to the idea 17 that Mr Coulson be engaged? Was she very favourable or 18 not? 19 A. As far as I can remember, she thought it was a good 20 decision because she thought he was an effective 21 operator. 22 Q. Your evidence is that there was a meeting -- we think it 23 was probably in March 2007. If one ties that up with 24 Mr Coulson's evidence, he places the meeting as being in 25 your office in the Norman Shaw South building, which of 103 1 course is the leader of the opposition's building. 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. That's paragraph 29 of his witness statement. Might 4 that be correct, that part of his evidence? 5 A. My recollection is that the meeting took place in my 6 office, and for me that was the key meeting about 7 deciding whether or not to employ him. I've been back 8 over the diaries and the records and it's difficult to 9 piece together everything, but that's my recollection, 10 that that was the sort of key meeting. 11 Q. And his evidence is also that there was a later 12 discussion, this time by telephone. 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. In late May of 2007. It's paragraph 31 of his 15 statement. And it was on that second occasion that you 16 raised the issue of phone hacking. Does that accord 17 with your recollection? 18 A. My recollection is that I raised the issue of phone 19 hacking and sought the assurance in the face-to-face 20 meeting we had in my office. That's my recollection. 21 I vaguely remember the further telephone call, but 22 that's -- I've obviously racked my brains to try and 23 remember exactly the sequencing, but my recollection is 24 that I knew it was very important that I needed to ask 25 him that question, and therefore did so, as it says in 104 1 my evidence. 2 Q. But in your witness statement, Mr Cameron, at 3 paragraph 223 at the bottom of page 04168, you state 4 that in particular in 2007, in the months after he 5 resigned, various people and you separately had 6 conversations with him. That's the conversation which, 7 matched up with Mr Coulson's evidence paragraph 29, took 8 place in March 2007 in your offices in the Norman Shaw 9 South building. Then the further conversation is 10 paragraph 227. 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Which must have been the phone conversation in late May, 13 and it's on that occasion where you state you asked him 14 for assurances. Do you see that? 15 A. I do. I think -- 227: 16 "I then had a further conversation with Andy Coulson 17 in which I asked him specifically about his involvement 18 in the hacking case." 19 That is what I remember being the face-to-face 20 meeting. 21 Q. Ah. He has them the other way around. Maybe we should 22 see specifically his account. 23 A. Okay. 24 Q. My recollection is that he was on holiday in Cornwall 25 and that you spoke by phone. This may be tab 58 of the 105 1 second bundle. Yes, it's tab 58 of the second bundle. 2 A. Which paragraph is it? Do you know? 3 Q. Yes. It's paragraph 29 at page 02412. He says there 4 that after the meeting with Mr Osborne, which he dates 5 as taking place in March 2007, he says that he believes 6 that you called him later that night and you'd like to 7 meet. 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. "We did so, at some point soon after, at his 10 Parliamentary office in the Norman Shaw South building 11 and we had a discussion about the job." 12 And I've linked that one up with paragraph 223 of 13 your witness statement. 14 A. Mm. 15 Q. Then there was a pause because there were local 16 elections. 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. And then paragraph 31, 02413: 19 "The hiring process was completed in a phone 20 conversation with Mr Cameron whilst I was on holiday in 21 Cornwall. During that conversation I believe he told me 22 that background security checks had been made. He also 23 asked me about the Clive Goodman case." 24 That links up, I think, with your paragraph 227. So 25 if that all was correct, it was only during the second 106 1 conversation that the issue of the Goodman case was 2 raised. Might that be correct? 3 A. That's not my recollection. My recollection is that the 4 assurances I sought were in the face-to-face meeting, 5 but it may be there was a further specific question 6 I needed to ask in the phone call, I can't remember. 7 What I'm absolutely sure about is I remember the 8 conversation with Ed Llewellyn was how important it was 9 to seek the assurance, and I remember very clearly 10 seeking that assurance and getting the assurance. 11 But, as I say, there do seem to be some differences, 12 but they may well be compatible in the way that I've 13 suggested. Anyway, I'm certain I sought the assurances, 14 he's certain I sought the assurances, he just says it 15 happened at a different time. The key thing is I asked 16 for assurances, I got them, and that was the basis on 17 which I employed him. 18 Q. Although to be fair to him, and -- well, we need to be 19 fair to everyone, but paragraph 227 dates the assurance 20 or links the assurance to the further conversation, 21 doesn't it, Mr Cameron? That was your recollection when 22 the witness statement was prepared, wasn't it? 23 A. Yes. But as I say, my recollection is that assurance 24 was at this face-to-face meeting. 25 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Mr Coulson actually seems to think 107 1 there may have been further conversations with you, 2 because if you go back to paragraph 30 of his statement, 3 he says: 4 "Conversations/discussions stalled during the local 5 election period towards the end of May. They were 6 restarted and after further conversations with 7 Mr Cameron, Francis Maude, Ed Llewellyn and Steve 8 Hilton, I was offered the job ... the hiring process was 9 completed in a phone conversation." 10 A. There may well have been more conversations because 11 there are lots of different ways of describing 12 a Director of Communications: are they campaigns and 13 communications? Who are they managing? There were 14 quite a lot of different potential -- they're all 15 similar roles, but slightly different potential roles he 16 could have fulfilled. 17 I don't see any fundamental inconsistency. We both 18 agree I asked for assurances and got them, but the exact 19 timing, I'm clear in my mind because I remember the 20 conversation with Ed Llewellyn, I remember the 21 importance of the interview, but, you know, that's my 22 recollection. 23 MR JAY: When you accepted the assurances, did you assess 24 there to be any risk? 25 A. What I assessed was that this was clearly 108 1 a controversial appointment, and controversial for two 2 reasons. One was that bad things had happened at the 3 News of the World while he was editor and he had 4 resigned. So he had left his last job after resigning 5 because of things that had happened. So that was 6 obviously -- as I said in my evidence, I was giving him 7 a second chance. 8 The second reason it was -- there was controversy is 9 this was a tabloid editor and there are some people who 10 would say, you know, "Don't have a tabloid editor", to 11 which my answer would be: it's a very tough job, dealing 12 with the press for a major political party. You need 13 someone who has the skills, who has the knowledge, who 14 can really help you through what can be an absolute 15 storm, and so I thought it was the right thing to do. 16 I just make one other point, which is -- because 17 I recognise this is a controversial appointment, this 18 has come back to haunt both him and me and I've said 19 what I've said about 20/20 hindsight, but in doing the 20 job as Director of Communications for the Conservative 21 Party, and then Director of Communications in Downing 22 Street, he did the job very effectively. There weren't 23 any complaints about how he conducted himself. He ran 24 a very effective team. He behaved in a very proper way. 25 Of course, if that wasn't the case, then I think 109 1 people would have an even stronger argument of saying, 2 "Well, you took a risk, you employed this person and 3 look what's happened." He did his job very well, and 4 I think that is an important point to make. 5 Q. Okay, Mr Cameron. May I ask you about the risks 6 associated with his being a tabloid editor. Could you 7 be more precise about what those risks were. Did it 8 amount to some people thinking tabloid editors might not 9 be the most scrupulous people? 10 A. It wasn't so much that. I think it was -- you know, 11 some people just don't -- didn't approve of what the 12 News of the World had done or what tabloids do. I think 13 it was more that. 14 Q. Which aspects of what tabloids do was in focus here? 15 A. Well, obviously, you know, quite aggressive articles 16 sometimes. You know, you had -- when George Osborne was 17 here, you had a story about him. You know, Andy Coulson 18 probably came up with the most effective and destructive 19 headline about me that anyone's managed, which was three 20 words I never uttered, which was "Hug a hoodie". 21 The point I'm making is there were some people I 22 think in the Conservative Party who would have said, 23 "Don't have a tabloid editor". My view was that it was 24 necessary to have someone tough and robust. I found in 25 my dealings with him that actually he did his job very 110 1 well and actually he was someone who had, I think, 2 a good code of behaviour in how he did his job. 3 Q. Well, this Inquiry has been looking at the culture, 4 practices and ethics of the press, and tabloids, of 5 course, have featured in that. 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. They are, some would say, associated with some of the 8 worst aspects of the culture, practices and ethics of 9 the press, so it might be said that was the risk you 10 were taking, mightn't it? 11 A. As I say, I think the risks are the ones I've set out. 12 Those were what I considered and I made my decision. 13 Q. On the first aspect -- you were talking about the 14 controversial aspects of this -- of course he'd resigned 15 in January 2007. Did you assess at all that there was 16 a risk that the matter might, as it were, go further 17 than Mr Goodman or not? 18 A. I asked for the undertaking about what he knew and he 19 said that he had resigned because he did not know, and 20 while -- obviously I have to be careful what I say, but 21 these were undertakings that were given to the DCMS 22 Select Committee, these were undertakings that were 23 accepted by the police, that were accepted by the Press 24 Complaints Commission, that were be given to a court in 25 a perjury trial. They were undertakings that were 111 1 strong enough for Gordon Brown to phone Andy Coulson 2 shortly after he resigned and wish him well with his 3 future. 4 So, yes, I accepted these undertakings but so did 5 many other people and organisations who did 6 a considerable amount to try and get to the bottom of 7 this issue. I said in Parliament if I've been lied to, 8 so has the CPS, the police, the DCMS select committee 9 and all the rest of it. 10 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: And, of course, we're not making 11 a judgment one way or the other. 12 A. Of course. 13 MR JAY: But you obtained -- I have to be careful the way 14 I put the question for all sorts of reasons, Mr Cameron, 15 but there was no independent verification of the oral 16 undertaking he gave you, was there? 17 A. Well, no, but, as I say, this issue had been 18 investigated by others. So it was not just that I had 19 an undertaking, it was others had had an undertaking, 20 and if we look at the period as I'm sure we will coming 21 up, it was an assurance that was then given again to the 22 DCMS Select Committee, and they found and the police 23 found and the CPS found that there wasn't the evidence 24 that he knew what was happening. 25 Q. Why did you feel that he deserved a second chance? 112 1 A. Because I think I thought that he had done, as far as 2 I could see it at the time, the honourable thing. 3 Something very bad had happened at the newspaper he was 4 editing. He did not know, and he resigned. So I felt, 5 given the assurances he gave me, that it was legitimate 6 to give him a second chance. 7 Q. Is it your evidence that his News International 8 background was irrelevant to his merits, as it were? 9 A. Well, obviously his knowledge of the industry, his 10 contacts, his work as an editor were all important, but 11 the most important thing was: is this person going to be 12 good at doing the job of managing the press and 13 communications for the Conservative Party? I wasn't 14 just after some -- any old person from 15 News International or from the Daily Mail or from 16 wherever. I wanted somebody really good who was going 17 to be able to stand up to the pressure that we were 18 under and would face in the run-up to an election 19 campaign. That was the absolutely key consideration. 20 Q. I'm sure that the most important considerations were the 21 ones you've identified, otherwise you would have been 22 completely mad to have employed him, but I think the 23 question was slightly more nuanced. 24 A. Right. 25 Q. Is it your evidence that his News International 113 1 background was irrelevant to the decision, in other 2 words it was a factor? 3 A. No, it wasn't irrelevant, clearly. As I said, his 4 contacts, his knowledge, his work at a newspaper, all of 5 that mattered. But if what lies behind the question 6 were you after a News International executive because 7 this was going to make it easier to win over the News of 8 the World or whatever, no, that wasn't the calculation. 9 The calculation was: who is going to be good enough, 10 tough enough, to deal with what is a very difficult job? 11 And, as I say, something that he did extremely well. 12 Q. In paragraph 231, you talk about 20/20 hindsight. May 13 I ask you this, though: do you now believe that you've 14 made an error of judgment, in particular your judgment 15 may have been clouded by the fact that Mr Coulson was 16 close to News International and his recruitment was 17 a major fillip to you? 18 A. No, I don't -- my -- what I meant in the House of 19 Commons, what I said then, was that look if I knew then 20 all the things that would happen and all the 21 consequences that would change, then that's 20/20 22 hindsight. But I said in the House of Commons and I'll 23 say again today you don't make decisions with 20/20 24 hindsight. I made the decision I made, I've set out the 25 reasons why I made it, I will be held accountable for 114 1 that decision, I don't try and run away from it, I just 2 try and explain why I made it. 3 Q. Move forward in time please to July 2009 -- 4 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just before you do, could I ask 5 a question? You made a point about Mr Coulson, that 6 he'd been responsible for a particular headline using 7 words you'd never uttered, "Hug a hoodie". I just 8 wonder whether you felt that it was a concern that he 9 could and was prepared to misrepresent a policy that you 10 were concerned about? 11 A. I think it comes back to this fusing of news and 12 comment, I suppose. I mean, the speech I made was quite 13 a radical departure for a Conservative leader to say 14 that we needed to understand why young people can go off 15 the rails and we need to recognise that it's not just 16 you need tough punishment, but also you need strong 17 families, you need respect in your community, and I said 18 you need love, and to talk about love in that context, 19 some right wing commentators thought, you know, that's 20 soft and whatever, and I think that's nonsense. I think 21 that's incredibly important for young people. 22 So was it -- it was frustrating that he had come up 23 with this headline that linked three words I hadn't 24 actually used, but can I really put my hand on my heart 25 and say it was completely unfair and wrong? That's what 115 1 newspapers do. They make a point. 2 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: All right. 3 A. They have a go. If you're worried about headlines, 4 don't make speeches about love, I suppose is what I'd 5 say. But anyway, it meant that one very good headline 6 writer wouldn't be writing any more headlines, he'd be 7 working for me. 8 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: All right. 9 MR JAY: July 2009 now, Mr Cameron. We're moving forward to 10 the Guardian piece and to paragraph 254 of your 11 statement. I think it's clear that you were aware of 12 the Guardian article at the time; is that right? 13 A. Yes. I think so. I think I was probably more aware of 14 this Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee that 15 I referred to in paragraph 257, because that was 16 obviously an event that was going to affect the running 17 of my office and everything that was happening, and that 18 I think was the most relevant, but obviously the two 19 were linked, really. 20 Q. So the gist of what the Guardian article contained was 21 drawn to your attention one way or the other, was it? 22 A. I'm sure it was, yes. I can't -- yes, I'm sure it was. 23 Q. What was your reaction at the time to that which was 24 contained in the Guardian article? 25 A. Throughout this process, the sort of test I set was: is 116 1 there new information that shows that the undertakings 2 I was given were wrong? I didn't see evidence that the 3 undertakings I was given were wrong, and at this time 4 Andy Coulson went in front of the Culture, Media and 5 Sport Select Committee and gave the assurance all over 6 again that, as it says here: 7 "I never condoned the use of phone hacking, nor do 8 I have any recollection of incidences where phone 9 hacking took place." 10 Q. You also say in paragraph 257 that: 11 "Nevertheless in the light of these stories I asked 12 Andy Coulson to repeat the assurances." 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. You must have been sufficiently concerned to do that, 15 mustn't you? 16 A. Yes, absolutely. As I say, I think it was also linked 17 to the DCMS Select Committee appearance because my 18 memory of this is that he was going to make that 19 appearance and I had a conversation with him about, 20 well, when you make this appearance, presumably you will 21 give the undertakings again that you gave to me. That 22 was the nature of the conversation, as I recall it. 23 Q. Was there an inkling of doubt in your mind at that stage 24 or not? 25 A. Well, given the assurances that I was given, that they 117 1 were repeated to the Select Committee, and that the 2 Select Committee found that there wasn't evidence that 3 he knew, I thought it was right that he carried on 4 working for me. 5 Q. I'm not seeking to impugn in any way Mr Coulson's 6 assurances, but you were reliant on his word and nothing 7 much else, were you? 8 A. No, I don't really accept that. Because I was reliant 9 on his word, but as I say, I was also reliant on the 10 fact that the Press Complaints Commission had accepted 11 his word, the Select Committee had accepted his word, 12 the police had accepted his word, the Crown Prosecution 13 had accepted his word. So this was not just me 14 accepting an assurance and blocking out anything that 15 happened subsequently. It was a whole series of 16 institutions taking that view, and as I say, the test 17 I set -- because you have to try and get on with the job 18 in hand -- was: look, if someone gives me evidence that 19 he knew about phone hacking, I wouldn't have employed 20 him and I would have fired him. But I didn't get that 21 information so I didn't take that step. 22 Q. To be fair to Mr Coulson, I should say that 23 paragraph 257 of your statement was not directly put by 24 me to Mr Coulson, and therefore no inferences should be 25 drawn from that part of his evidence. 118 1 Of course, by July 2009, he'd been in post for at 2 least two years, and you presumably felt that he had 3 been an effective operator in your cause; is that 4 correct? 5 A. Absolutely. And not just that, but he'd done the job 6 not just in an effective way, but he, as far as I could 7 see, had done it in a way where he was trusted by the 8 people that worked with him and he'd done the job in 9 a proper way. 10 Q. And to be clear, the repetition of the assurance, was it 11 sought in a face-to-face meeting, to the best of your 12 recollection, or phone call or by some other means? 13 A. To the best of my recollection, although it's very 14 difficult to do the specifics on this, to the best of my 15 recollection it was because of the impending Select 16 Committee hearing, and I think -- obviously the 17 embarrassment there was that he was being taken through 18 a Select Committee hearing while he was working for me, 19 and it was in that context that I think we had this 20 discussion. 21 Q. I'm sure it was in that context, but just the means of 22 communication. 23 A. I don't recall. 24 Q. Call him into your office, phone call, can you recall? 25 A. I don't recall. With your director of communications 119 1 you're seeing every day, you're working with hand in 2 glove, I don't remember the instance. 3 Q. It's likely to be a face-to-face meeting, isn't it? 4 A. Likely. 5 MR JAY: I'm going to move on in time about nine months now 6 to Downing Street, so maybe we can break before that 7 happens. 8 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Nine months seems a sufficient break 9 to allow us to have a break now. Very good. 2 o'clock, 10 thank you very much, Prime Minister. 11 (1.00 pm) 12 (The luncheon adjournment) 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 120