

Witness: Sir Paul Stephenson  
Statement No: 2  
Exhibits Referred to: SPS/1  
Date Statement Made: 17 March 2012

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**The Leveson Inquiry into the Culture Practices and Ethics of the Press**

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**Witness:** Sir Paul Stephenson

**Address:** c/o Metropolitan Police Service, New Scotland Yard

1. Following Mr Quick's evidence to the Leveson Inquiry on 7 March 2012, I wish to submit a statement supplementary to my statement dated 20 February 2012.
2. Mr Quick referred to the work I commissioned him to carry out in relation to Operation Ribble (the 'cash for honours investigation'). In particular, he referred to a recommendation he made (recommendation 12) relating to retrospective analysis of Mr Yates' telephones, making the point that this was a standard approach when someone is suspected of leaking. The recommendation "that consideration should be given" to such an approach was made in his letter to me dated 29 January 2007. However, it is clear from this correspondence and his related draft report of 8 January 2007 that there were no grounds arising from his work to suspect Mr Yates of leaking. Indeed, Mr Quick's letter, report and conversation with me, taken together provided a strong endorsement of Mr Yates' integrity in regard to this and previous investigations. This

being the case, the only reason for carrying out such work would be defensive in nature regarding any future allegations about Mr Yates. This was made clear in Mr Quick's aforementioned letter when he stated the purpose of his recommendations was "to reduce the risk of unfounded or malicious allegations, attempts to orchestrate any form of compromise or attempts to discredit his professional or personal integrity".

3. However, as a defensive tactic it offered little of value in preventing malicious and unfounded smears and innuendo, and the very act of doing it may even have added further weight to such attacks by suggesting there may be grounds for employing a line of enquiry addressed to the suspicion that the subject may be behaving improperly.
4. Further, I can state that at no time during this period did Mr Quick say or write anything that I could have interpreted as suggesting there were any grounds for doubting Mr Yates' integrity. Rather, Mr Quick achieved precisely the opposite.
5. In short I would have believed that I had no grounds for implementing this intrusive recommendation and indeed reason for not doing so.
6. I turn now to Mr Quick's recollection and interpretation of events relative to the arrest of Mr Green, at the time a Conservative Shadow Minister.
7. Mr Quick refers to my telephone call to him on the evening of 30 November and his concerns regarding what I said. I can confirm that the call did take place. The purpose was merely to offer support to a colleague and someone who worked for me. Indeed, it was usual practice between senior colleagues to ring and offer such support in the

face of unpleasant and personal media attacks – I had received such calls both on this and other occasions. To portray this otherwise is simply wrong.

8. He further refers to me telling him that I had “written out my resignation”. I will not rehearse here the inaccuracy of his recollection as I believe this was demonstrated by Mr Godwin’s oral evidence to the Inquiry. In addition I attach as exhibit SPS/1 to this statement a copy of the handwritten note I read from on the day (which has been transcribed and is also attached). Though perhaps capable of misunderstanding and faded memory, Mr Quick was quite certain of the accuracy of his recollection until given the opportunity to consider the potential for misinterpretation by the Chairman of the Inquiry. Additionally, though this apparent failure of memory may seem quite innocuous, if one is attempting unfairly to afflict reputational damage, the assertion of anxiety and resignation, as opposed to what was actually the case, (i.e. considered analysis, evident in the note, pointing towards not putting my name forward for the post of Commissioner and retiring in the normal way) may be considered to be of assistance in such an exercise. Mr Quick had told me that he intended to apply for the vacant post of Commissioner and I had made it clear to him and others that I believed him to be a highly credible candidate – neither at the time nor since have I sought to characterize his decision not to do so in a negative way.
9. Mr Quick seems anxious to ensure that it is known that I was aware of the intention to arrest Mr Green and that I did not overrule him. He need not be. I have always acknowledged that I had the opportunity to veto

the arrest of Mr Green, and though he and I had a serious discussion regarding the matter, I did not do so. There was never a 'furious row'. It would have been an extraordinary decision to overrule such an experienced Assistant Commissioner in these circumstances, when he was intimate with the details of the investigation in a way I could not possibly be. Indeed, there would normally be no real expectation that the Commissioner, or Acting Commissioner as I was at the time, would intervene and overrule in such a matter. It is fair to say that subsequently I have considered that the investigation would have benefited from a little less haste and further reflection by him at the time.

10. My concern following the arrest of Mr Green was based upon maintaining confidence in the MPS and ensuring that in the face of such overwhelming criticism we didn't simply adopt a defensive position which failed to challenge the appropriateness of our actions. It also has to be said that I was aware of significant concern from a number of senior colleagues, including from outside the MPS, regarding his judgement in this matter.
11. In commissioning Sir Ian Johnston, an experienced and highly regarded Chief Constable, I was acting upon the motivation I outline. It is a matter of record that he subsequently raised concerns regarding the proportionality of Mr Green's arrest. He also considered there to be some other issues of concern in relation to the investigation, attempting to encourage Mr Quick to deal with them in as tactful a manner as possible.
12. My Acting Deputy Commissioner, Mr Godwin, made it clear to me that he

supported Johnston's conclusions and considered Mr Quick to have adopted a closed and defensive position.

13. Mr Quick asserts that I asked him to stop the investigation. I was concerned that he was failing to consider the view of senior colleagues and it was my right and duty as his Acting Commissioner to challenge him in these circumstances. It was clearly the case that we could not just stop the investigation. However, I wanted him to consider whether, as we were being advised, we might have erred in making the judgement call, and if so how we should deal with this. Mr Quick omits to mention that he agreed, I believe in the same meeting, that he had been let down by some of his staff involved in the investigation, something that Mr Godwin informed me that he had raised with the relevant staff in the presence of Mr Quick in the latter's office.
14. I also notice that in his evidence to the Inquiry, Mr Godwin did not support Mr Quick's recollection of a statement the former was supposed to have made upon hearing that the DPP wished to see the investigation completed ("Stephenson would go ballistic and would pull the inquiry anyway"). Not only did Mr Godwin not recall the last part of that statement, he made it clear that he was referring to my likely concerns as to the length of time this was taking.
15. I refer now to the adverse publicity Mr Quick received following revelations regarding his wife's wedding car business. I had no knowledge of this matter prior to this time. On becoming aware, I, like many other senior officers, wondered as to the wisdom of this arrangement for the head of UK policings, counter terrorism effort.

However, I felt extremely sorry for him with regards to the media attention this drew for him and his family. I was aware that the head of the DPA, Mr Fedorcio had made representations on Mr Quick's behalf regarding the original story. However, Mr Quick's assertion that I should have intervened directly with the editor of the Mail on Sunday is simply naïve. I knew from previous experience, and was advised, that such intervention would have no effect whatsoever.

16. I can confirm that on Monday 22 December 2008, following Mr Quick's regrettable outburst to a reporter alleging a corrupt relationship between the Mail on Sunday and the Conservative party, I saw him in my office and asked him if he could stand up his allegations. On being informed that he could not I advised him to issue an apology forthwith.

17. I make this additional statement in the knowledge that we all provide our view of historical events based upon the best of our recollections. I do not wish to enter into a debate as to whose recollections are most accurate. Rather, it is my intention to ensure that the Chairman of the Inquiry is aware that Mr Quick's evidence, and in particular his interpretation of events, as they relate to me, should not be accepted as fair and wholly accurate by reason of absence of challenge.

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**I believe the facts stated in this witness statement are true**

Signed.....



Dated.....

17.3.12